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Introduction
Ecosystem management has been 
vigorously debated at many meetings, 
conferences, and workshops (Inter-
agency Ecosystem Management Task 
Force, 1995; Malone, 1995; Stanley, 
1995; Christensen et al., 1996; Mangel 
et al., 1996; Schramm and Hubert, 1996; 
Czech and Krausman, 1997; NMFS, 
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ABSTRACT—This paper presents nine 
tenets for management as formulated in the 
literature in recent decades. These tenets, 
and the principles behind them, form the 
foundation for systemic management. All 
tenets are interrelated and far from mutu-
ally exclusive or discrete. When we con-
sider them seriously and simultaneously, 
these tenets expose serious ﬂaws of con-
ventional resource management and deﬁne 
systemic management. Systemic manage-
ment requires that we manage inclusively 
and avoid restricting management to any 
particular interaction between humans and 
other elements of nature.
The management tenets presented here 
are considered with particular attention 
to the interrelationships among both the 
tenets and principles upon which they are 
based. The case is made that the tenets are 
inseparable and should be applied collec-
tively. Combined consideration of the tenets 
clariﬁes the role of science, contributes to 
progress in deﬁning management, and leads 
to the development of ways we can avoid 
mistakes of past management. Systemic 
management emerges as at least one form of 
management that will consistently account 
for and apply to the complexities of nature.
1999; McCormick, 1999). The result-
ing volume of literature contains lists of 
tenets (requirements, demands, or crite-
ria, reviewed in Appendix 1) as progress 
toward an appropriate form of manage-
ment. Recent panels and commissions 
have urged their implementation (Pew 
Oceans Commission, 2003; U.S. Com-
mission on Ocean Policy1).
Part of this effort has been a reac-
tion to the realization that conven-
tional resource management schemes 
have too often failed and need to be 
The planet Earth, a tiny island in our solar system, galaxy, and universe, supports 
a living system known as the biosphere, a relatively thin layer near the surface. 
The biosphere is one of the systems affected by human activities — a system to be 
considered in management (Photo courtesy of NASA/GSFC/NOAA/USGS).
1 An ocean blueprint for the 21st century. Final 
Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 
1120 20th Street, NW, Suite 200 North, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20036.
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replaced with effective measures. For 
example, the limitations of single-spe-
cies natural resource management are 
well recognized, as are their resulting 
failures (Wagner, 1977; Cairns, 1986; 
Magnuson, 1986; Schaeffer et al., 1988; 
Ludwig et al., 1993; Saﬁna, 1995; NRC, 
1999). More generally, many traditional 
forms of management, as a whole, have 
been subject to criticism (Cairns, 1991; 
Salwasser, 1993; Malone, 1995) or seen 
as fundamentally ﬂawed and in need of 
replacement (Norton, 1991; Pickett and 
Ostfeld, 1995). Perhaps most convincing 
is the set of problems that confront us as 
results of past management deﬁciencies 
(Fowler and Hobbs, 2002, 2003).
The failures of conventional manage-
ment have been noted in environmental 
change which is usually evaluated as 
degradation (Auerbach, 1981; Silver 
and DeFries, 1990; Turner et al., 1990; 
Woodwell, 1990; World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre, 1992; Meyer and 
Turner, 1994; Christensen et al., 1996; 
Vitousek et al., 1997). Such failures have 
underscored the need to deﬁne and devise 
an effective form of management.
Clearly, there is a need for a manage-
rial approach that would not only apply 
to multispecies assemblages (Cairns, 
1986) but also to ecosystems (Agee and 
Johnson, 1988; Murawski, 1991; Appo-
lonio, 1994; Moote et al.2). Many eco-
systems are judged to be in poor health, 
exemplified by papers dealing with 
ecosystem health or integrity (Schaeffer 
et al., 1988; Rapport, 1989). As a result, 
extensive effort has gone into deﬁn-
ing alternative forms of management, 
especially those that would include 
ecosystems (Major, 1969; Vallentyne 
and Hamilton, 1988; Grumbine, 1994; 
Stanley, 1995; Christensen et al., 1996). 
Many of these efforts involve attempts 
to deﬁne what has often been called 
“ecosystem management” (Stanley, 
1995; Christensen et al., 1996; Sampson 
and Knopf, 1996; Jørgensen and Müller, 
2000; Moote et al.2).
Through these efforts, some measure 
of progress toward including ecosystems 
in management processes has been 
realized. Several mandated efforts are 
underway to do this, and various na-
tional and international agencies have 
adopted policies to require ecosystem 
approaches to management and to show 
commitment to the management prin-
ciples (basic knowledge, understanding, 
accepted or axiomatic assumptions) that 
include ecosystems (Munn, 1993; Wal-
lace, 1994; Stanley, 1995; Christensen 
et al., 1996). The concept of extending 
management to the ecosystem level 
has been generally accepted (Pastor, 
1995), as is the need to carry out such 
management.
It is important, however, to avoid 
mistakes, especially those that would 
ignore lessons from past experience. 
One of those lessons involves an error of 
conventional or traditional management 
as applied in resource use, business, 
health, or the world economy. This error 
is the lack of adequate consideration 
of complexity and context when deal-
ing with the interconnectedness of the 
natural world. We should not restrict our 
focus to ecosystems because that would 
ignore other important considerations. 
Thus, it is important to ﬁnd a form of 
management that works at numerous 
levels, neither rejecting single-species 
approaches (even if, in the end, single-
species approaches need to be modiﬁed) 
nor precluding ecosystem approaches. 
To abandon single-species approaches, 
while striving to regulate our use of 
ecosystems, would invite failure.
 Corals (Calcigorgia spiculifera shown here, a cold water coral from Alaska) repre-
sent a taxonomic group poorly represented in decision making by managers, either 
in making decisions about the harvest of ﬁsh in associated ecosystems, or in regu-
lating direct effects on species such as corals. Likewise, the symbioses represented 
by many tropical corals exemplify processes that are poorly represented in what is 
accounted for by managers (Photo courtesy of: Anne Simpson, NMFS).
2 Moote, M. A., S. Burke, H. J. Cortner, and M. 
B. Wallace. 1994. Principles of ecosystem man-
agement. Unpubl. doc. avail. at Water Resources 
Research Center, College of Agriculture, Univ. 
Ariz., 14 p.
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This line of logic continues: there 
are many levels of biological organiza-
tion. What if we developed a form of 
management at the ecosystem level and 
then discovered that it was insufﬁcient 
because we had neglected consideration 
of the biosphere, biomes, communities, 
species, individuals, organs, or cells? 
Focusing on the ecosystem, to the 
exclusion of other levels of biological 
organization, would undoubtedly get 
us into even larger problems than has 
conventional focus on single-species 
management.
In other words, management must be 
fully systemic; it must account for, and 
apply to, everything (Lackey, 1995–96). 
The approach has to be one that, in fact, 
can provide speciﬁc management focus 
to address the variety of individual 
issues (e.g. the biomass that we harvest 
from any individual species, CO2 pro-
duction, harvest from ecosystems, or 
an individual’s blood pressure). Very 
importantly, however, each specific 
focus must embody an accounting for 
complexity that does not lose sight of 
either context (extrinsic factors: e.g. the 
environment, ecosystems, the biosphere) 
or content/components (intrinsic factors: 
e.g. chemical reactions, physiological 
processes, age structure, individual 
based dynamics, behavior).
This may sound impossible. Although 
past experience leads us to believe that 
a few of the elements we know to be 
at play in nature can be temporarily 
ignored, (a common practice in ﬁsher-
ies management since the mid 1950’s 
(Smith, 1994)), achieving a full account-
ing of complexity is one of the areas 
where change is necessary. In spite of 
the inconvenience, we have the respon-
sibility of taking on the challenge — one 
of the missions of this paper.
Conventional resource management 
fails to account for many risks and 
limiting factors. We conﬁne our con-
sideration to factors that we can list or 
understand well enough to include in 
models or environmental assessments. 
For example, Canter (1996) provides 
instructions for making matrices with 
marginal lists of factors to consider; but 
these lists can never be exhaustive owing 
to the fact that “. . . there is a selection 
of data because the total universe, past 
and present, is not subject to observation 
. . .” (Bateson, 1972). In the end, we seek 
a way that accounts for everything and 
which will apply to everything (Lackey, 
1995–96).
As a step forward, we need to recog-
nize past and present shortcomings. As 
many assert, we must be open to trying 
entirely different approaches (Santos, 
1990; Pﬁster, 1993; Cortner and Moote, 
1994; Mangel et al., 1996; Schramm 
and Hubert, 1996; NRC, 1999). We 
may even need an entirely new para-
digm upon which to base management 
(Norton, 1991; Pickett and Ostfeld, 
1995). To determine if an approach is 
acceptable, we must ﬁrst understand the 
criteria that have been developed. These 
criteria are the demands made of man-
agement — tenets to which management 
must adhere. One of the main objectives 
of this paper is that of reviewing the 
tenets (requirements, demands, criteria) 
and the substantiating principles (basic 
knowledge, understanding, axioms, 
assumptions) on which they are based. 
The tenets are products of the history 
of examining management, with spe-
cial emphasis on ecosystems, as a step 
toward encompassing greater complex-
ity. Collectively, these tenets (Table 
1, Appendix 2) serve as a prescriptive 
basis for judging and then accepting or 
rejecting alternative forms of manage-
ment (Haeuber and Franklin, 1996). The 
approaches in use today fail to meet the 
standards deﬁned by the tenets.
This paper assumes that management 
must have common elements regardless 
of the application, question, or system 
involved. In other words, the principles 
behind the tenets (especially the 1st and 
2nd tenets) are treated axiomatically. 
There may be more to management that 
will emerge as its history unfolds and 
additional needs become acknowledged. 
However, it is important to recognize 
progress as we attempt to address the 
limits and failures of conventional ap-
proaches and move forward with sys-
temic management.
The term “systemic management,” 
as the management described herein, 
might be confused with the approach 
presented by de Rosnay (1979) and 
many other presentations of “systemic 
management” found on the World Wide 
Web. Systemic management, as deﬁned 
here, incorporates and expands upon the 
principles of de Rosnay’s systemic ap-
proach. In particular, systemic manage-
ment incorporates the limits of science, 
human perception(s), and control as 
a matter of principle. Management as 
described here removes the option of 
engineering or designing ecosystems to 
be the way that we want them (Tenet 8); 
political, social, religious, economic, or 
legal special interests are eclipsed by the 
laws of nature.
There are other differences between 
systemic management and the systemic 
approach de Rosnay (1979) describes. 
To an extent, de Rosnay’s systemic 
approach is a “systems” approach that 
acknowledges context and environment 
(e.g. ecosystems interact with each 
other and occur within the biosphere). 
However, this is accomplished in the 
“systemic approach” at the expense 
of balanced consideration of intrinsic 
Table 1. — The nine tenets of management documented in this paper. These are presented in greater detail in 
Appendix 2 and, in the main body of the paper, are developed in regard to the principles on which they are based.
1) Consistent applicability: Management must in every way be applicable at all levels of biological organization, 
simultaneously and consistently.
2) Accountability for complexity: Management must account for complexity/reality and each element and factor must receive 
importance in proportion to its relative signiﬁcance.
3) Guidance from normative patterns: Systems, components of systems, processes, and interactions must fall within their 
respective normal ranges of natural variation.
4) Risk averse: Management must be precautionary and avoid risk in achieving sustainability.
5) Interdisciplinary: Management must be based on the realm of scientiﬁc studies and thereby include all disciplines.
6) Information based: Management must be based upon information, including the products of scientiﬁc research, 
monitoring, and assessment.
7) Measurability: Management must be guided by clearly deﬁned and measurable goals and objectives.
8) Limited control: Management must be carried out in a way that recognizes that control over other systems (e.g. species 
and ecosystems) is mostly impossible.
9) Human involvement: Management must involve humans and their role as components of at least some natural 
systems.
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factors, or constituent elements, inter-
actions, and dynamics of subsystems. 
The main difference is that their actual 
relative importance is taken into account 
in systemic management, as developed 
in this paper, rather than being given 
importance based on human appraisal 
and choices — a common problem with 
much of what is described elsewhere as 
systemic management.
In the following sections, it may 
seem like we are trapped or face the 
impossible as we work through the 
process of combining the various tenets. 
Relief is found in the fact that some 
tenets help solve the dilemmas created 
by adhering to belief systems behind 
conventional approaches. The inter-
relationships among the various tenets 
will be emphasized in the review of 
each separate tenet in the next section 
and again in the discussion. The ﬁnal 
sections outline systemic management 
as a form of management that emerges 
and is deﬁned by the principles and 
tenets reviewed below.
The distinctions among the various 
tenets may seem somewhat artiﬁcial, 
but each one serves to help emphasize a 
part in the overall process. A great deal 
of what we have done, have been doing, 
or do, under the guise of management, 
has been misguided. Some of what we 
are doing will have to be abandoned in 
the change toward adhering to all of 
the tenets.
Tenets and Principles  
for Management
The set of tenets for management in 
Table 1 materialized during about three 
decades of efforts to deﬁne management 
(Mangel et al., 1996; Christensen et 
al., 1996; Czech and Krausman, 1997; 
NMFS, 1999; McCormick, 1999; NRC, 
1999; Fowler and Hobbs, 2002; Moote 
et al.2; Appendices 1 and 2). They serve 
as criteria for management and can be 
used to evaluate alternative forms of 
management. They can be used to judge 
the process but not the results (Appen-
dix 2, Fowler et al., 1999; Fowler and 
Hobbs, 2002). In this section, the nine 
tenets are considered as they have been 
presented in the management literature 
and as they relate to each other and the 
Evolutionary forces result in differentiation and change such as the loss of ﬂight 
among various species of birds, exempliﬁed by the Adelie penguin, Pygoscelis 
adeliae. Evolutionary processes in general, are not given the attention in 
conventional management that is given to factors such as predator/prey interactions. 
In particular, the evolutionary/genetic effects of human activities on other species 
play a relatively minor role in the guidance of current management (Photo courtesy 
of, and copyright by: Larry Hobbs, Inland Whale).
principles upon which they are based. 
The section ends with consideration of 
other important issues raised in the lit-
erature, most of which are components 
of one or more of the nine tenets chosen 
for explicit listing.
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Tenet 1: Management Must In 
Every Way Be Applicable at All 
Levels of Biological Organization, 
Simultaneously and Consistently.
There are several principles behind 
Tenet 1:
1) In their complexity, biological 
systems fall into various levels of 
organization (e.g. individuals, spe-
cies, ecosystems),
2) Nature is internally consistent 
because the laws of nature are not 
broken in, or by, nature, and,
3) In reality everything is intercon-
nected in some way.
Tenet 1 states that management must 
have applications that consider the hi-
erarchical structure of nature and apply 
consistently at all levels, including eco-
systems. There are various scales of time 
and space and each must be accounted 
for in management.
Management cannot be limited to 
an approach that works only for an 
individual species, a collection of indi-
vidual species, or an entire ecosystem. 
Management applicable to both a group 
of species and their ecosystem, while an 
improvement, would still be inadequate 
because there are more levels of bio-
logical organization. For example, each 
ecosystem is embedded within a matrix 
of other ecosystems and the regulation 
of our use of any particular ecosystem 
must take into account that ecosystem’s 
context (one of the speciﬁc requirements 
of management emphasized by Chris-
tensen et al., 1996). Thus, the biosphere 
is also considered extremely important 
in achieving sustainability (Myers, 
1989; Lubchenco et al., 1991; Fuentes, 
1993; Vallentyne, 1993; Huntley et al., 
1991). Some refer to management in 
regard to planet Earth (Santos, 1990) or 
the ecosphere (Pﬁster, 1993).
Of course, scale in the levels of 
biological organization goes the other 
way as well. There are proteins, cells, 
embryological processes, individual 
organisms, and behavior. These are also 
parts of the complexity for which we 
must account (Tenet 2). In addition to 
including such factors in the manage-
ment of our interaction with ecosystems, 
our activities at all such levels must 
also be managed in parallel fashion 
(i.e. medicine and veterinary care must 
be conducted in ways that account for 
species and ecosystems).
Including ecosystems in the folds of 
management has been one of the main 
points made in environmentally oriented 
management literature of the 1980’s and 
1990’s, and it has been called for repeat-
edly (Nash, 1991; Mangel et al., 1996; 
Christensen et al., 1996; NMFS, 1999; 
NRC, 1999; Moote et al.2, and refer-
ences therein). However, it is clear that 
this is a call for expansion to include, 
rather than an abandonment of, man-
agement involving individual species. 
Single-species approaches may need to 
be different, but they cannot be dropped 
from consideration for they are part of 
the complexity we must consider (Tenets 
1 and 2). Some criticisms of single-spe-
cies approaches fall just short of calling 
for their abandonment (Schaeffer et al., 
1988). However, most of the literature 
emphasizes the importance of maintain-
ing a component of management that 
deals with individual species (Terborgh, 
1974; Cairns, 1986; Magnuson, 1986; 
Ehrlich, 1987; Norton, 1987; Salwas-
ser, 1988; Reed, 1989; Woodruff, 1989; 
Westman, 1990; Sherman et al., 1991; 
Franklin, 1993a; Mangel et al., 1996; 
NRC, 1999) with special importance 
placed on remembering to include the 
human species (Tenet 9).
However, consideration of any in-
dividual species must include all its 
interactions with other species (e.g. 
The red salmon (sockeye, Oncorhynchus nerka), exhibits a complicated life history involving both fresh and marine waters. Eggs 
are deposited in fresh water (usually streams), young ﬁsh feed in lake systems, and adults return after feeding in the ocean, bringing 
with them tons of nutrients. The complexity of life history and the ﬂow of nutrients among ecosystems count among factors that 
contribute to the complexity of importance to management (Photo supplied by, and copyright by: Charles Fowler).
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coevolutionary interactions, Thompson, 
1994) thus returning us to the need to go 
beyond, without abandoning, consider-
ation of individual species. One of the 
difﬁculties of moving toward includ-
ing ecosystems has been reluctance to 
change the single-species approaches 
that have been used for so long (e.g. 
maximum sustainable yield [MSY], and 
modiﬁcations of such approaches, in the 
regulation of resource use). The current 
emphasis on establishing protected areas 
(e.g. marine reserves) is an attempt to 
include more factors but in ways that 
again fail to achieve a full consideration 
of complexity or consistency with other 
regulations (e.g. single-species harvest 
levels in ﬁsheries).
Making management consistent at the 
various levels of biological organization, 
and in various scales of time and space, 
is a serious challenge. The futility of 
doing so with conventional approaches 
is relieved by Tenet 8 (we cannot do the 
impossible). Consider a hypothetical 
example involving our use of ﬁsheries 
resources. Managers have a signiﬁcant 
problem if one aspect of management 
(e.g. a single-species approach) results 
in professional advice to harvest or 
consume from a particular population 
of an individual resource species at 
one rate (say, 100,000 metric tons [t] 
per year), while a second scheme (e.g. 
management at the ecosystem level) 
produces totally different advice (e.g. a 
total take of only 10,000 t), and a third 
form of management suggests another 
strategy (say only 1,000 t per year) in 
consideration of the biosphere. There is 
no objective way to chose; each appears 
appropriate for only one application yet 
we ﬁnd ourselves involved in all three 
simultaneously. It would appear, espe-
cially in this hypothetical example, that 
considering greater complexity leads 
to greater reductions in resource con-
sumption. Would full consideration of 
complexity result in advice to consume 
nothing? Excluding ourselves entirely 
is not an option (Tenet 9).
Yet there remains the need to manage 
so that we do not ignore species, ecosys-
tems, or the biosphere. Simultaneously, 
management must apply consistently 
at various scales of time and space. 
There must be a form of management 
that applies at all levels consistently. 
Collectively, the hierarchical structure 
of nature represents one piece of com-
plexity (Tenet 2) that is being empha-
sized here. Thus, the needed approach 
also should be one that integrates such 
considerations (Cairns, 1991) so they 
apply simultaneously. Otherwise, we 
have no clear objectives or goals (Tenet 
7). If there is inconsistency that spans 
orders of magnitude (as in the hypotheti-
cal ﬁsheries example above), such op-
tions provide great latitude to consider 
anthropocentric issues (e.g. economic, 
political, social, or religious), thereby 
assigning them unrealistic importance 
leading to mistakes.
Such approaches would not consider 
the complexity of nature (Tenet 2) in a 
way that avoids placing unrealistic sig-
niﬁcance on human values and human 
enterprise. Managers could overem-
phasize human elements by taking 
advantage of the leeway among the 
alternatives. This leeway could come 
from advice (often conﬂicting) provided 
by well meaning experts from different 
disciplines of science. However, sci-
ence is limited in this regard. Scientiﬁc 
principles are descriptive, not prescrip-
tive (Santos, 1990), and science, as 
currently practiced, may never be able 
to provide consistent advice (Ludwig 
et al., 1993).
Of the three hypothetical options 
above for ﬁsheries catches, the 100,000 
t option could easily make more sense 
economically. Short-term solutions often 
create long-term problems. Mistakes can 
easily be made by making decisions 
this way, especially in consideration of 
short-term issues such as economics, 
to the exclusion of long-term concerns 
such as extinction. Such conﬂicts often 
become expressed in differing objec-
tives by different management agencies 
within the same government (Wagner, 
Pathogens often affect the physiology and behavior of host individuals, making 
them more prone to predation and thereby inﬂuencing their population dynamics. 
The microsporidian Thelohania sp., is shown here exhibiting ﬁve of its eight spores 
in a pansporoblast with lipid droplets (dark circular spots), nuclear bodies, and polar 
ﬁlaments. The microscopic structures, chemistry, and physiology of organisms are 
part of the complexity important to management (Photo courtesy of: Frank Morado, 
NMFS).
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1977; NRC, 1999). All things must be 
considered simultaneously and consis-
tently to avoid a violation of the laws 
of nature.
The conﬂicts to be avoided in ﬁnding 
consistency are perhaps nowhere felt 
more directly than in the dichotomy 
perceived in the anthropocentric vs. 
the biocentric interpretations of vari-
ous management alternatives (Stanley, 
1995). The short-term needs of humans 
must be balanced against the needs of 
other species (Salwasser et al., 1993), 
ecosystems, and ultimately, the long-
term needs of humans. However, conﬂict 
emerges when alternatives are given 
emphasis based on human value systems 
(Salwasser et al., 1993; Stanley, 1995; 
Christensen et al., 1996; Carpenter, 
1995; NRC, 1999).
How do we avoid such conflict, 
especially when it has its roots in the 
opposing forces of nature (Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002)? Every species has 
needs that are in conﬂict with those of 
others. Every species has at least some 
deleterious effects on its ecosystem. 
Every species depends on ecosystems 
to meet its needs. This is all part of the 
complexity that we have to take into 
account (Tenet 2).
Despite obvious difﬁculties, we are 
not relieved of the need to ensure that 
any aspect of management is carried out 
consistently with the others. To com-
plicate things even more, we must also 
address all issues for which it is possible 
to undertake management. For example, 
it is insufﬁcient to manage so that har-
vests of deer are sustainable. Nor is it 
enough to regulate the rate at which we 
introduce species to new environments, 
or to ensure that the CO2 that we produce 
is within sustainable levels; we have 
to manage all of our activities (Cairns, 
1991). We have to manage things such as 
our consumption of individual resources 
(e.g. ﬁsheries, forests), our occupation 
of space, our population size, the areas 
that we set aside for reserves, the nitro-
gen that we consume, the energy that 
we use, and the genetic impacts that we 
have on other species (Policansky and 
Magnuson, 1998; NRC, 1996, 1999; 
Conover and Munch, 2002). The list is 
virtually endless (Tenet 2).
All elements of management must 
be consistent. Every form of inﬂuence 
we have at each of the various levels of 
biological organization must conform 
with the others. We can’t focus on CO2 
production without involving energy 
consumption, and the management of 
each one must be consistent with the 
management of the other. We cannot 
manage our production of polluting 
substances and ignore our consumption 
of resources. They have to be considered 
collectively and simultaneously (Tenets 
2 and 5).
Tenet 2: Management Must Account 
for Complexity/Reality and Each 
Element and Factor Must Receive 
Importance in Proportion to its 
Relative Signiﬁcance.
Tenet 2 is based on the principle that 
reality, or nature, involves complexity 
(Appendix 3) and diversity of unknown 
limits. Reality includes all components, 
with all of their interrelationships, not 
only among levels of organization (Tenet 
1), but also within each level. Each (e.g. 
component, element, or process) exerts 
its own level of importance and, in vari-
ous ways, interacts with, or is connected 
to, the others. In principle, implementa-
tion of this tenet requires full acceptance 
of human limitations, and the potential 
of circumventing them through full ac-
ceptance of the concept of emergence 
in which observed patterns are an inte-
gration of all the factors contributing to 
their formation.
Much management literature contains 
lists of factors to be considered. Owing 
to human limitation, these lists are re-
stricted to factors regarded as important 
to account for in making particular man-
agement decisions (Appendix 3). The 
failures of conventional management 
have often been explained by noting that 
such lists are incomplete. For example, 
the failures of single-species manage-
ment (e.g. ﬁsheries or forests) occur 
because habitat fragmentation, genetic 
effects, restructuring of the ecosystem, 
or the risk of extinction (for any spe-
cies, including humans, Tenet 9) are 
not fully considered. It is impossible to 
consider the unknown. These criticisms 
lead to attempts to ﬁnd a way to extend 
management so that more complexity 
is embraced .
Including ecosystems is a step toward 
considering greater complexity in the 
management process, but it is insufﬁcient 
(Tenet 1, Christensen et al. 1996). For 
ecosystems, the elements of complex-
ity include energy ﬂow, coevolutionary 
dynamics, predator/prey interactions, 
habitat size, climate, seasonal variation, 
extinction, and succession — the list is 
inﬁnite (Appendix 3). Ecosystems repre-
sent complexity beyond that of individu-
als or species because they are inclusive 
systems comprised of populations (with 
their individuals) interacting with those 
of other species and their environments 
with their own complexities.
The fact that nature is complex has 
led to axiomatic statements of this fact 
as one of the principles behind efforts to 
extend management to include ecosys-
tems (e.g. NRC, 1999; NMFS, 1999). 
Environmental impact statements and 
consideration of species for legal protec-
tion (e.g. the Endangered Species Act) 
often involve thinking about such com-
plexity (see Canter (1996), for examples 
in the application of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA)). How-
ever, human limitations prevail and such 
thinking leads to an incomplete listing 
of the various elements of complexity. 
Thus, such listings do not lead to advice 
that, when implemented in management, 
fully accounts for complexity, or meet 
the requirements of the other eight tenets 
considered here.
The populations of the various species around the world (exempliﬁed by the chinstrap penguins, Pygoscelis antarctica, shown here) are 
elements that interact within their ecosystems. These interactions include serving as resources, consuming resources, competing, and 
having genetic effects through coevolutionary processes—all elements to be taken into account in management (Photo courtesy of, and 
copyright by: Larry Hobbs, Inland Whale).
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Any list of the elements of nature will 
be incomplete because science involves 
the ongoing discovery and description of 
new processes, interrelationships, pat-
terns, species, systems, levels of organi-
zation, etc. Hierarchically, there are tens 
of thousands of chemical compounds, 
cells, species, communities, ecosystems, 
and the biosphere with all their interac-
tions and physical processes and forces 
(e.g. diffusion, adhesion, evaporation, 
crystallization, gravity, radiation). The 
various ﬁelds of science have resulted 
in encyclopedic listings and knowledge 
concerning such factors — all in publica-
tions that ﬁll our libraries.
There is no known limit to the detail 
of such matters, and it is clear that there 
is still much to be learned. However, 
many things are probably completely 
unknowable (Holling, 1993), as exem-
pliﬁed by the fact that we cannot predict 
the properties of water based on our 
very detailed understanding of oxygen 
and hydrogen. Uncertainty (including 
the unknown) is part of the complexity 
that we have to deal with (Noss, 1993; 
Christensen et al., 1996), but it can never 
be completely eliminated (NRC, 1999). 
The question to be addressed is: how do 
we ﬁnd guidance for, and then conduct 
management so, the realm of complexity 
is accounted for with each element being 
given weight in proportion to its relative 
importance? How do we account for 
everything, including the unknowable? 
We must do so to meet the requirements 
of both Tenets 1 and 2.
A key factor in getting past what 
seems like an impossible situation, is 
the fact that out of complexity, patterns 
emerge, many of which are unpredictable 
(Bateson, 1972; Prigogine and Stengers, 
1984; Gleick, 1987; Lewin, 1992). This 
emergence is a general phenomena of 
complex systems (Lewin, 1992; Kauff-
man, 1993; Emlen et al., 1998) and not 
adequately accounted for in current 
forms of management. The integration 
of complexity inherent in emergence is 
central to circumventing the impasses 
that seem to confront us. The way this 
works needs further exploration.
How do we proceed with emergence 
in mind and the fact that Tenet 2 requires 
that everything (Lackey, 1995–96) has 
to be taken into account — known (Ap-
pendix 3) or unknown (Ehrlich, 1987; 
Christensen et al., 1996), predictable 
or unpredictable? Everything plays a 
different role in nature and each facet 
is of different importance; nothing can 
be assumed to be completely negligible. 
Those things called “butterﬂy effects” 
seem small but have incalculable impor-
tance (recall the life, war, or kingdom 
lost for want of a nail), especially collec-
tively and over long time scales (Gleick, 
1987; these effects are often referred to 
as the effects of initial conditions, many 
of which can be of minuscule importance 
when considered out of context: Merton, 
1936; Bateson, 1979; Koehl, 1989; Pen-
nycuick, 1992; Williams, 1992; Brown 
et al., 1996). The combination of all of 
the factors that may seem negligible may 
outweigh any single factor that we now 
consider to be the most important. The 
list of known components and processes 
in nature continues to grow, and among 
the unknown may be factors that we will 
judge to be of extreme importance once 
they are recognized.
Regardless of the impasse (human 
limits) reached when we try to think 
about it, we are left with the need for 
full consideration of the complexity of 
reality over the various scales of time, 
space, and biological organization (the 
latter emphasized in Tenet 1 and Ap-
pendix 3). The context of environmental 
factors (e.g. ecological complexity) 
must be accounted for along with the 
elements of stochasticity and the di-
versity of processes, mechanics, and 
dynamics. We are required to proceed 
with an accounting of the complexity 
of organizational structure, elements, 
organs, and physical and chemical pro-
cesses. How can this be done, given that 
it is impossible to include everything in 
our thinking (Agee and Johnson, 1988; 
Cairns, 1991; Allen and Hoekstra, 1992; 
Stanley, 1995). The impossibility of 
Grazing animals, wild (such as the zebra, Equus burchelli) or domestic, affect 
soils. Winds blow dust (including pathogenic organisms) into the atmosphere to be 
distributed from one continent to another. Rains result in runoff that carries materials 
to rivers and oceans. These effects exemplify processes that link terrestrial and 
aquatic systems—links and processes to be accounted for in management (Photo 
supplied by, and copyright by: Charles Fowler).
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The populations of various species, such as the horned pufﬁn, Fratercula corniculata, are monitored as indicators 
of ecosystem health. Declining trends form a basis for examining the roles humans play in related systems insofar 
as they contribute to such changes and whether or not our inﬂuence (directly on the species or on their ecosystem)  
is sustainable (Photo supplied by: Charles Fowler, NMFS).
thinking about the unknown is obvious. 
How do we weigh the unknown relative 
to the known? Tenet 2 requires that it be 
done, and, as will be ampliﬁed below, 
emergent patterns provide an integration 
of such factors. Thus, using empirical 
examples of sustainability makes it 
possible owing to their exposure to and 
emergence from reality (Fowler et al., 
1999; Fowler, 2002; Fowler and Hobbs, 
2002, Fowler and Crawford, 2004) to 
provide guidance (Tenet 7).
The need to consider (or account 
for) complexity falls into at least three 
categories:
1) Variety in the management questions 
and issues that call for management 
action,
2) Complexity as it is involved in the 
information used to guide action (i.e. 
complexity involved in setting each 
speciﬁc individual goal and objec-
tive, Tenet 7), and
3) Complexity in accounting for 
the effects of our actions and/or 
inactions.
We humans (Tenet 9) have inﬂuence 
on the many nonhuman elements of our 
environment. The combination of kinds 
of inﬂuence and the number of nonhu-
man elements gives rise to the variety 
of management questions regarding 
sustainable inﬂuence (category 1). We 
experience feedback from our inﬂuence 
in a variety of time scales (category 3), 
and we need guidance that accounts for 
both the inﬂuence and feedback involv-
ing all nonhuman factors (category 2). 
As will be seen below, conventional 
management falls short in all three 
categories.
Variety in Management Questions
Attempts to consider complexity are 
reﬂected in conventional approaches to 
management as well as in many exten-
sions to include ecosystems. These are 
largely superﬁcial steps to make things 
be what we want them to be, or manag-
ing things so that they work the way that 
we think they should work. However, 
such attempts have exposed a wide 
variety of things that are deemed impor-
tant to do. As a glimpse at complexity, 
this variety is reﬂected in much of the 
literature behind the lists in Appendix 
3. For example, it is common to see 
“ecosystem management” deﬁned as 
the maintenance of ecosystem integrity 
(Rapport, 1989; Callicott, 1992; Munn, 
1993; Salwasser et al., 1993; Steedman 
and Haider, 1993; Woodley et al., 1993; 
Angermeier and Karr, 1994; Grumbine, 
1994; Malone, 1995; Christensen et al., 
1996; Grumbine, 1997; Moote et al.2).
Within the general objective of 
maintaining ecosystem integrity are the 
more speciﬁc objectives of maintaining 
viable populations of species, ensuring 
endangered species recovery, maintain-
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ing structural and genetic diversity, 
restoring ecosystems that have been 
damaged, and maintaining biologi-
cal diversity and ecological processes 
(Clark and Zaunbrecher, 1987; Noss, 
1990a; Salwasser et al., 1993; Pickett 
and Ostfeld, 1995). Other aspects of 
general ecosystem integrity include 
primary productivity, nutrient recycling, 
species richness, population variability, 
species diversity, species composition 
by body size, contaminant loads and 
dynamics, productivity in general, and 
the portion of species considered to 
be pests (Rapport, 1989; Munn, 1993; 
Wood, 1994).
Conventional approaches include 
the identiﬁed need to restore critical 
ecological components, and structures 
(Moote et al.2), and the regulation of in-
ternal ecosystem structure and function, 
inputs, and outputs (Johnson and Agee, 
1988). The attributes of ecosystems are 
seen as subject to management carried 
out so as to ensure that desired objec-
tives are achieved (Tenet 7). If we adhere 
to the combination of Tenets 1, 2, 3, and 
7, all such attributes and factors would 
be dealt with to achieve the desired 
goals. This would deal with complexity 
in its full breadth of application (again, 
breadth that is narrowed signiﬁcantly 
by Tenet 8).
In moving beyond single-species ap-
proaches to management (those typical 
of current or traditional resource man-
agement), various attempts have been 
made to develop a method for guiding 
and regulating the harvest of groups of 
species in multispecies ﬁsheries (Sis-
senwine and Daan, 1991). Such attempts 
are examples of our historical effort to 
broaden the list of things for which we 
have management goals. Augmenting 
such lists is part of our effort to deal 
with the ﬁrst of the three categories 
listed above by posing more manage-
ment questions. In spite of the known 
needs, however, current management is 
largely conﬁned to practices much like 
those of the past. Many management 
questions are left largely unaddressed. 
For example, managing to account for 
genetic effects of harvesting and to ﬁnd 
sustainable harvests from ecosystems 
has not been possible.
Every management question that we 
can pose adds to our consideration of 
complexity (Tenets 1 and 2). Each item 
of management must be a matter of clear 
focus and the list of such items must be 
as exhaustive as possible. The list of 
what has to be done is itself complex 
and reﬂects the complexity of reality, 
but it does not provide guidance based 
on anything beyond the need to address 
every item on the list.
Complexity in Guidance
The response to each individual man-
agement question must be guided by a 
full accounting of complexity. We must 
fully account for complexity in setting 
every individual goal (Tenet 7) required 
of management. In conventional ap-
proaches, this is often attempted by 
constructing synthetic models to provide 
guiding standards. Including more com-
plexity (components, processes, etc.) in 
such models represents real, but very 
limited, progress. To completely account 
for complexity, we see that we cannot 
focus so narrowly that we lose sight of 
the complete array of elements involved. 
Synthetic models never involve an 
exhaustive representation of reality. If 
we were able to construct an adequate 
model for use in management, it would 
represent all aspects of complexity.
We cannot manage harvests of re-
sources without considering genetic im-
pacts, indirect effects on other species, 
coevolutionary interactions, variation in 
climate, and energy ﬂow in ecosystems. 
Individuals, behaviors, and pheromone 
systems must be taken into account as 
well as the nature of the human species 
(e.g. our mean adult body size, our 
trophic level, our metabolic rate, our 
relationships with other species, etc.). 
Human systems are complex and are 
part of the complexity to be considered 
(Tenet 9).
We must also account for extenuating 
circumstances at the time management 
action is taken: environmental condi-
tions, weather, climate, soil or water 
quality, and season. In addition to pres-
ent circumstances, there are the histori-
cal aspects of complexity, including the 
historical effects of all environmental 
factors.
The prairie chicken, Tympanuchus cupido, exhibits a mating behavior in which 
sounds made by the male are important in courtship. Sound is an important factor 
in the lives of most species, including the mother/pup communication in northern 
fur seals, and the location of food by many cetaceans. The role of sound in both 
individual and species-level interactions is an element of ecosystems largely lost in 
deﬁning the goals of traditional management (Photo courtesy of, and copyright by: 
Bruce Fowler).
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Scavenger species, such as the common snapping turtle, Chelydra serpentina, occur in many ecosystems. Their food 
habits and trophic level are contributions to the structure and function of their ecosystems fully accounted for in 
systemic management (Photo courtesy of, and copyright by: Bruce Fowler).
Accounting for the Effects of 
Our Actions and/or Inactions
The “Law of Unintended Conse-
quences” (Tenner, 1996; Rohman, 1999; 
Gillon, 2000; Lueck, 2000) maintains 
that, owing to complexity (and empha-
sizing interconnectedness as part of real-
ity; Christensen et al., 1996), there will 
always be ripple effects, secondary (and 
higher order) reactions, side effects, re-
percussions or domino effects resulting 
from the actions that we take or choose 
not to take (Wilcox and Murphy, 1985). 
Some will be desirable, others will not, 
and many will remain unknown. The 
inﬂuence that our decisions and actions 
have on other individuals, species, 
ecosystems, and the biosphere must be 
accounted for. 
Examples of our inﬂuence include the 
genetic effects we have on other species 
(Sutherland, 1990; Policansky and Mag-
nuson, 1998; NRC, 1996, 1999; Conover 
and Munch, 2002). Humans (Tenet 9) 
constitute part of the environment for 
these species. At a larger scale, examples 
are provided by the effects that we have 
on ecosystems. Many changes have 
been documented in marine ecosystems 
(Pauly et al., 1998; Hall, 1999; Kaiser 
and de Groot, 1999; Jackson et al., 2001; 
Myers and Worm, 2003). In terrestrial 
environments, we have seen our actions 
lead to reduced primary production, loss 
of nutrients, loss of species diversity, 
dominance by short-lived opportunistic 
and often exotic species, increased ﬂuc-
tuations in key populations, retrogression 
in biotic structure, increased incidence 
of disease, and other changes (Rap-
port, 1989; see also Silver and DeFries, 
1990; Turner et al., 1990; Woodwell, 
1990; World Conservation Monitoring 
Centre, 1992; Meyer and Turner, 1994; 
Christensen et al., 1996; Vitousek et al., 
1997). Interconnectedness, as part of the 
complexity of things, guarantees that 
there will be such inﬂuences, many that 
we cannot measure, and many that affect 
humans through feedback.
Thus, inﬂuence is not restricted to our 
impacts on our environment; it is not a 
one-way phenomena. There is always 
reciprocity to include the feedback to 
humans from the nonhuman elements 
of ecosystems that we affect. Owing to 
interconnectedness, the consequences 
of our actions include all reactions. 
The ways such reactions affect us are 
exemplified by emergent diseases, 
malnutrition, compromised immune 
systems, depleted atmospheric ozone, 
and global warming, often with consid-
erable time lags.
Because our activities have impacts, 
and result in feedback, such dynamics 
must be accounted for in management 
under Tenet 2. This challenge must be 
met while also adhering to the other 
tenets, particularly Tenet 3 which re-
quires us to do everything possible to 
ensure that our actions are not, and do 
not result in anything, abnormal (Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002).
In combining Tenet 1 with Tenet 2, 
“hierarchy” must be in the mix of con-
siderations to account for complexity. 
For example, consider the question of 
how to catch ﬁsh. This leads to another 
question: how many ﬁsh to catch. The 
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answer cannot be based only on our 
needs; it must include consideration of 
the capacity of ﬁshed systems (popula-
tions, communities, ecosystems, guilds) 
to produce ﬁsh. Thus, one central ques-
tion in ﬁsheries management is: how 
many ﬁsh (or how much biomass) should 
we catch of a particular species?
This leads to further questions such 
as: how many ﬁsh should we catch from 
an ecosystem, and how many species 
should we include in the catch? Another 
question involves what to do to save an 
endangered species, but this also leads to 
the question of how many species there 
should be. For example, what constitutes 
Northern fur seals, Callorhinus ursinus, exemplify species that move among various ecosystems, spending part of the year in each 
one. The fact that many species move among ecosystems emphasizes the need for considering combined temporal/spatial scales in 
decision making (Photo supplied by: Charles Fowler, NMFS).
insufﬁcient diversity, or the converse, 
excessive diversity?
Also, asking how we should produce 
food leads to asking how much we 
should produce. How we feed people 
then leads to needing to know how many 
people should there be to feed (and 
sensitive issues such as limitations on 
human population). Although extremely 
challenging, these questions cannot be 
avoided in meeting the requirements of 
Tenet 1 and in accounting for complex-
ity needed to adhere to Tenet 2.
Another matter that cannot be left un-
attended is that of “relative importance.” 
It is always easier to make suggestions 
than to assign relative importance. It 
is impossible to realistically and ob-
jectively assign relative “importance” 
to what managers ought to consider in 
ranking questions, setting goals (Tenet 
7), and evaluating the ramiﬁcations of 
our actions.
The limits of science have long 
been recognized (Bateson, 1972, 1979; 
Santos, 1990; Peters, 1991; Walters, 
1992; McIntyre, 1998; NRC, 1999; 
Makous, 2000; Schnute and Richards, 
2001), largely as a reﬂection of human 
limits in general. The ability to rank 
all factors is beyond the scope of cur-
rent forms of science (Ludwig et al., 
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1993). Scientists often debate relative 
importance, even occasionally find 
themselves trying to boil things down 
to a single factor or a very few factors 
believed to be most important. In the 
end, Tenets 1 and 2 require that each 
item be considered in proportion to its 
relative importance, and none should 
be neglected. In regulating our harvest 
of resources, it has historically been as-
sumed that population dynamics weighs 
heavily among the important issues to 
consider. The concept of maximum sus-
tainable yield (now completely rejected 
by some (Stanley, 1995)) was used for 
years until it was realized that there was 
more to account for than population 
dynamics. In this case, we would be 
hard pressed to place much weight on 
the effects of moonlight, yet it cannot 
be ignored because we know it makes 
a difference in the feeding strategies of 
many species. Conventional manage-
ment schemes fail to fully account for 
individuals within populations, their 
physiology, their behavior, or their age. 
Management to adhere to Tenets 1 and 
2, on the other hand, would consider all 
of the factors involved in complexity in 
a way that each factor is accounted for 
in proportion to its importance relative 
to that of all other factors.
Conventional approaches have fo-
cused on processes, factors, and ele-
ments of recognized primary importance 
(those seen as ﬁrst order effects; Smith, 
1994 provides an introduction to the 
history of this thinking in ﬁsheries). 
We do not deny the existence of second 
and third order factors, indirect effects, 
feedback, time lags, and factors for 
which we have not been able to demon-
strate statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence 
or importance. However, they are not 
included in most conventional manage-
ment schemes, either in proportion to 
the individual importance of each factor, 
or, especially, in proportion to their col-
lective importance. Many such things 
are missing from the models used to 
consider management options. It is safe 
to speculate that the collective effects of 
ignored factors are often (if not always) 
more important than any one of the 
individual factors that we now consider 
directly — the ﬁrst-order or primary fac-
tors. This is part of what the move toward 
(and now beyond) “ecosystem manage-
ment” is all about — trying to take into 
account the cumulative effects of all of 
the factors that are left unrepresented (or 
under-represented, or misrepresented) in 
conventional approaches.
Thus, accounting for complexity in its 
collective form is a primary challenge 
(Tenet 5). The unending list of factors, 
elements, processes, effects, and reper-
cussions that scientists can generate is 
no more than that — a list, and always an 
incomplete list (Bateson, 1972). Every-
thing must be accounted for in manage-
ment and doing so by adding one factor 
after another in conventional processes 
is insufﬁcient for deriving goals (clearly 
impossible using current approaches, if 
we are to be exhaustive).
How can we treat all factors in com-
bination when providing ourselves with 
guidance? The factors themselves all 
have interactions in reality (Costanza 
et al,. 1992; NMFS, 1999), and these 
combinations are parts of what must 
be considered. What tool, model, or 
process can be used to be sure that the 
combination is taken into account so 
that all of complexity is considered with 
each element considered in proportion 
to its relative importance? It appears 
impossible to answer this question using 
conventional approaches to manage-
ment. This is a strong argument that such 
approaches are insufﬁcient/inadequate 
and need to be replaced rather than ex-
tended or perfected. Accounting for, and 
considering, complexity in its aggregate 
stands as a primary requirement of Tenet 
2. As will be seen ahead, reality (nature) 
itself becomes the model for considering 
complexity in management; this is best 
achieved in adhering to Tenet 3, wherein 
patterns that are emergent from reality 
reﬂect natural limits in ways that auto-
matically provide a complete accounting 
for complexity.
Tenet 3: Systems, Components of 
Systems, Processes, and Interactions 
Must Fall Within Their Respective 
Normal Ranges of Natural 
Variation.
The foundation for Tenet 3 is the 
principle that everything shows varia-
tion and this variation is limited (Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002, 2003). Both variation 
and its limits are products of complexity 
(Fowler and Crawford, 2004), embody 
complexity, are emergent from complex-
ity, and are part of complexity — all of 
which is interconnected. Limits include 
an integration of the risks that contribute 
to deﬁning observed patterns.
This core tenet of management has 
been developed in a variety of literature 
(as reviewed by Fowler and Hobbs, 
2002). It requires that any management 
action must maintain things (e.g. natural 
systems, their components, processes, 
and characteristics, etc.) within their 
normal range of natural variation (An-
derson, 1991; Johnston, 1992; Pickett 
et al., 1992; Fuentes, 1993; Apollonio, 
1994; Grumbine, 1994; Wood, 1994; 
Christensen et al., 1996; Holling and 
Meffe, 1996; Mangel et al., 1996; 
NMFS, 1999; Francis et al., 1999; Uhl 
et al., 2000; Fowler and Hobbs, 2002; 
Moote et al.2). A medical example 
is the practice of avoiding abnormal 
body temperatures, blood pressure, or 
body weight. We have the choice of 
avoiding abnormal situations that are 
pathological (Christensen et al. 1996, 
Fowler and Hobbs, 2002, 2003) or face 
the consequences (e.g. risks, including 
extinction, Tenet 4).
One objective of management, then, 
is to undertake action in every way 
possible to ensure that systems and 
processes such as individuals, species, 
ecosystems, predation, energy ﬂow, and 
coevolutionary interactions are within 
(or will return to) their respective normal 
ranges of natural variation (Rapport et 
al., 1981; Rapport et al., 1985; Chris-
tensen et al., 1996; Holling and Meffe, 
1996; Mangel et al., 1996). If we are to 
avoid the consequences (e.g. risks) of 
abnormality, any form of management 
must adhere to this tenet and it must be 
applied so as to simultaneously adhere 
to the other eight tenets.
One of the principles behind Tenet 
3 is that everything has its limits (Pi-
mentel, 1966; Bateson, 1972; Hyams, 
1976; Rapport et al., 1981; Pimm, 1982; 
Rapport et al., 1985; Salthe, 1985; 
O’Neill et al., 1986; Slobodkin, 1986; 
Koestler, 1987; Roughgarden, 1989; 
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Grime, 1989; Orians, 1990; Anderson, 
1991; Meadows et al., 1992; Pickett et 
al., 1992; McNeill, 1993; Wilber, 1995; 
Ahl and Allen, 1996; Christensen et al., 
1996; Holling and Meffe, 1996; Mangel 
et al., 1996; NMFS, 1999; Fowler and 
Hobbs, 2002; Moote et al.2). Some limits 
are obvious: we cannot take more than 
100% of the standing stock (plus its 
production) of a commercially valuable 
ﬁsh population in a commercial harvest; 
we cannot occupy more than 100% of a 
continent. Vice versa, human existence 
would be precluded if we consumed 
nothing (a violation of Tenet 9).
Other limits are more complicated. 
Systems, themselves, set limits on their 
components (Salthe, 1985; O’Neill et 
al., 1986; Koestler, 1987; Wilber, 1995; 
Fowler and Hobbs, 2002). A clear ex-
ample is seen in the fact that one species 
cannot consist of more than 100% of 
the biomass in an ecosystem, and one 
ecosystem cannot comprise more than 
100% of the biomass in the biosphere. 
The balance between the opposing upper 
and lower limits set on species’ popula-
tions (the balance commonly referred to 
as the carrying capacity) are systemic 
limits set by a combination of factors 
both intrinsic and extrinsic (which itself 
involves both top-down and bottom-up 
factors; Schoener, 1986; May, 1989; 
Estes, 1996). These limiting factors in-
clude such things as diseases, resource 
availability, population dynamics, meta-
bolic needs (and the related feature of 
body size), and predation — the list goes 
on (complexity).
Ecosystems are natural biotic sys-
tems and are included among those 
systems that are expected to fall within 
their normal range of natural variation 
through proper management. It is clear 
that there would be merit in doing 
whatever possible to ensure that the at-
tributes of ecosystems (e.g. those listed 
in Appendix 3, such as total biomass, 
biodiversity, mean trophic level) are 
not abnormal. It may be difﬁcult to get 
the normative information to evaluate 
ecosystems (King, 1993), but acquiring 
such information would be a signiﬁcant 
step toward deﬁning the goals required 
by Tenet 7. In line with Tenet 2, part of 
the motivation for identifying the ele-
ments of complexity is that of listing the 
things that would be good or desirable 
to have fall within their normal range 
of natural variation (see references in 
Appendix 3). The elements of com-
plexity include those associated with 
ecosystems. However, as identiﬁed in 
the discussion regarding Tenet 1, our 
accounting for complexity must be 
extended to biomes and the biosphere 
which are also important to have fall 
within their normal range of natural 
variation. Furthermore this must be done 
in a way that is consistent with ways it is 
done for medical and veterinary medi-
cine (Rapport, 1992) where abnormal 
blood pressure, body size, heart rates, 
food consumption, and body tempera-
tures are recognized as problems. At this 
point, it is important again to recognize 
human limits. How do we distinguish the 
possible from the impossible in deciding 
what kinds of efforts should be made to 
ensure that systems, processes, or other 
factors exhibit characteristics that are 
within their normal range of natural 
variation (Tenets 3, 8, and 9).
In part, the principle of avoiding 
the abnormal involves the concepts of 
integrity and health. It is possible to 
argue that a tropical rainforest reduced 
to one weed and an herbivore is still an 
ecosystem. However, few would accept 
it as desirable, or within the normal 
range of natural variation for such a 
system in the area where it occurs; most 
would consider it abnormal, unhealthy, 
or pathological.
In nearly everyone’s mind there are 
limits to the normal range of natural 
variation, whether it be for predation 
rates, population size, extinction rates, 
diversity, energy flow, or body size. 
Difﬁculties emerge in attempts to agree 
upon the interpretation of such limits, 
troublesome as they may be to mea-
sure. While there is general agreement 
that limits occur, what those limits are 
remains debatable. This has resulted 
in the recognition of Tenet 3 without 
speciﬁcation of operational means for 
implementation (Fowler and Hobbs, 
2002). This difﬁculty is, of course, not 
an argument against the principle but, 
rather a challenge to be met in deﬁning a 
form of management, scientiﬁc informa-
tion, and procedures that will succeed in 
achieving operational application.
Tenet 4: Management Must Be 
Precautionary and Avoid Risk  
in Achieving Sustainability.
The forces of nature pose risk. Among 
the elements of complexity (including 
ecosystem complexity) are the variety 
of risks experienced by individuals, 
species, and ecosystems. These include 
those that stem from human inﬂuence 
in our reciprocal interactions with the 
nonhuman. This principle adds depth 
to the issue of humans being parts of 
nature (Tenet 9). Avoiding risk entirely 
is impossible, and extreme risks (such 
as human extinction) are undesirable; 
either one would be in violation of 
Tenet 3. Management must find the 
moderation of a workable intermediate 
or middle way: sustainability.
Sustainability is a primary objective 
in most management schemes. It ap-
pears in the titles of many references 
cited here and in the literature upon 
which various advisory groups have 
based their deliberations (Orians, 1990; 
Patten, 1991; Naiman, 1992; Aplet et al., 
1993; Francis, 1993; Franklin, 1993b; 
Holling, 1993; Lee, 1993a,b; Mooney 
and Sala, 1993; National Commission 
of the Environment Staff, 1993; Noss, 
1993; Salwasser, 1993; Salwasser et 
al., 1993; Maerz, 1994; Wood, 1994; 
Carpenter, 1995; Interagency Ecosystem 
Management Task Force, 1995; Malone, 
1995; Christensen et al., 1996; Mangel 
et al., 1996; Schramm and Hubert, 1996; 
Moote et al.2). The thrust of Tenet 4 ad-
heres to the philosophy of maintenance 
rather than destruction and conservation 
rather than waste so that humans can 
have a viable presence (Tenet 9).
Part of the concept of sustainability 
involves maintaining natural systems 
within their normal range of natural 
variation (Tenet 3). It relates to the bal-
ance between human needs and the ca-
pacity for supportive systems to sustain 
human needs in mutual and reciprocally 
sustaining interactions. In principle, the 
need for achieving sustainability is well 
accepted even though it is recognized 
that, as a goal, the concept per se does 
not meet the demands of Tenet 7 in 
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The wandering albatross, Diomedea exulans, exhibits various behavioral patterns, such as this mating display, as do many species. 
Behavioral patterns are elements for consideration in the structure and function of ecosystems in the ways they relate to decision 
making in management (Photo courtesy of, and copyright by: Larry Hobbs, Inland Whale).
being clearly deﬁned, measurable, or 
quantiﬁable.
Avoiding risk is closely related to 
the concept of sustainability and is 
singled out for consideration in much 
of the literature on management (Agee 
and Johnson, 1988; Nash, 1991; Pastor, 
1995; Christensen et al., 1996; Mangel 
et al., 1996; NRC, 1999). Courting risk 
is the antithesis of sustainability. Risk 
avoidance is the main theme behind 
the precautionary approach to manage-
ment and is often seen as one way of 
dealing with uncertainty (Peterman and 
M’Gonigle, 1992; NRC, 1999). One 
kind of risk to be avoided is the risk 
inherent in assuming that secondary and 
higher order effects in the complexity of 
reality are unimportant or less important 
than primary factors. Another is that of 
ignoring such factors because they are 
difﬁcult to consider, or because they 
are unknowable. There is inherent risk 
involved in assuming that the unknown 
is unimportant. Tenet 4 requires that 
we account for risks and Tenets 1 and 
2 require that we include those that are 
unknown. Being humanly impossible, 
this brings us back to the integrative 
nature of emergent patterns and the 
continuing theme of using empirical 
information.
Thus, as with sustainability, avoid-
ing risk can be considered part of, and 
is certainly related to, Tenet 3. Risk is 
part of what contributes to observed 
limits (Fowler and Hobbs, 2002). For 
example a species that consumes all of 
its renewable resources will go extinct; 
therefore, today there are no species 
that consume all of their resources, and 
very few (if any) that consume most of 
their resources. Extinction is a risk to 
be avoided, as are risks associated with 
mortality — excessive mortality leads 
to extinction. These risks, of course, 
are impossible to avoid entirely and the 
change that they bring to natural systems 
is part of their natural dynamics. As in 
the case of other processes, however, 
we are bound to try to do what we can 
to keep them within their normal ranges 
of natural variation (Tenet 3).
As with anything systemic, however, 
there is more to risk than extinction or 
death. There are the risks of anthropo-
genic effects on other elements of vari-
ous biotic systems. These inﬂuences can 
result in the affected systems departing 
from their own normal ranges of natural 
variation. Enough of these effects can 
constitute systemic change that results 
in other risks, such as that of extinction, 
mortality, starvation, diseases — either 
for us, as feedback to the human ele-
ments in the system, or for other species. 
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We cannot alter (do not have the control 
to avoid, Tenet 8) the interconnected 
nature of systems (Tenet 5) that make 
such risks and limits a certainty.
Tenet 2 requires that we carry out 
management so that all risks are con-
sidered — something impossible in 
conventional approaches to manage-
ment. Risks count among the dynamics 
involved in the complexity of natural 
systems. Dealing with risks individu-
ally is illogical because mitigating for 
one risk usually causes others. It is also 
a practical impossibility because we 
have no objective way of evaluating the 
tradeoffs among risks. Nevertheless, 
Tenet 4 (in combination with Tenets 1 
and 2) requires that each has to be dealt 
with and they have to be dealt with not 
only collectively but also in proportion 
to their relative importance. Sustain-
ability is, by deﬁnition, not achieved by 
any form of management that generates 
more risks than it minimizes (keeping in 
mind that we cannot completely escape 
risk).
In either the case of risk or sustain-
ability, the element of temporal scale is 
fundamental. It is often mentioned that 
a goal for “ecosystem management” is 
to provide resources and environments 
that can sustain the people of future 
generations (Clark and Zaunbrecher, 
1987; Orians, 1990; Huntley et al., 
1991; Norton, 1991; Page, 1992; Fuen-
tes, 1993; Lee, 1993a; Salwasser et al., 
1993; Christensen et al., 1996; Mangel 
et al., 1996; NRC, 1999; Moote et al.2). 
This brings up the risk of extinction 
again, not just the risk of extinction of 
other species, but the risk of human ex-
tinction — another risk to be considered 
with its corresponding scales of time 
(Darwin, 1953; Mines, 1971; Lederberg, 
1973; Jarvis, 1978; Laughlin and Brady, 
1978; Bateson, 1979; Hassan, 1981; 
Capra, 1982; Jenkins, 1985; Reed, 1989; 
Tudge, 1989; Eldredge, 1991; Ponting, 
1991; Hern, 1993).
How do we ﬁnd a form of manage-
ment that can account for each and every 
risk, consider them as a combination, 
and account for each one in proportion 
to its relative importance? How can 
management do this simultaneously and 
account for the other principles of man-
agement at the same time? This is part 
of what management must do in order to 
adhere to all of the tenets and principles 
of management simultaneously. The 
answers to these questions continue to 
develop in an application of Tenet 3, 
where the integrative nature of empiri-
cal information provides a solution to 
the seeming dead-ends experienced in 
the thinking behind current forms of 
management.
Tenet 5: Management Must Be 
Based on the Realm of Scientiﬁc 
Studies and Thereby Include  
All Disciplines.
The principle behind Tenet 5 is that 
nature is a combination of its elements 
and processes such that they do not 
operate independently of one another: 
they are interconnected and consistent 
(none of the laws of nature are broken). 
Science needs to present guiding infor-
mation that reﬂects this combination, 
complexity, and consistency. Science 
can produce a wide variety of informa-
tion, only some of which is directly 
relevant to decision making.
The importance of science is stressed 
in much of the work where the principles 
of management are developed (e.g. 
Allen and Hoekstra, 1992; Grumbine, 
1994; Wood, 1994; Interagency Eco-
system Management Task Force, 1995; 
Malone, 1995; Christensen et al., 1996; 
Mangel et al., 1996). Interdisciplinary 
approaches are called for repeatedly.
Science plays four roles that vary in 
the degree to which they are useful in 
decision making:
1)  Discovery of new information 
(pushing forward the frontiers of 
knowledge and understanding of 
complexity; Loucks, 1985),
2)  Monitoring systems to provide a 
basis for evaluation,
3)  Measuring systems to determine 
the nature and limits of their natural 
variation (Fowler and Hobbs, 2002), 
and 
4)  Providing guidance.
The ﬁrst three roles of science have 
been or will be addressed in discus-
sions of Tenets 2, 3, 6, and 7. The role 
of science in validating our concept 
of complexity was covered above 
Taxon-speciﬁc patterns are not typically considered in the elements brought to bear 
in conventional management. One such pattern is that neoplasms are very rarely 
noted among arthropods. A neoplasm in red king crab, Paralithodes camtschaticus, 
is shown here as nested epitheliod cells embedded in inﬂamed cells of surrounding 
tissues (Photo courtesy of: Frank Morado, NMFS).
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(Tenet 2). It is important to monitor 
and evaluate ecosystems, just as it is 
with all systems, in progressing toward 
consideration of greater complexity 
(Steedman and Haider, 1993; Wood, 
1994; see also Tenet 6). The measure 
of natural variation was assumed to 
be a clear product of science in the 
treatment of Tenet 3 and is part of the 
study of complexity as well as monitor-
ing. The measure of variation and its 
limits will be treated in more detail in 
consideration of Tenet 7, where we link 
goals with limits to variation. As such, 
the ﬁrst three roles of science will not 
be given further detailed consideration 
in regard to Tenet 5. The following is a 
consideration of the fourth role: provid-
ing guidance.
The current role of science stems 
from the belief that conventional uses of 
science are adequate (or at least the best 
we have) to provide guidance (Grum-
bine, 1994; Wood, 1994; Christensen 
et al., 1996; Mangel et al., 1996; NRC, 
1999). In conventional approaches to 
management, this role exposes a ﬂaw: 
science is mostly descriptive, rather than 
prescriptive (Santos, 1990). In dealing 
with this ﬂaw, it is very important to note 
that, in the application of Tenet 5, we are 
attempting to get to a full consideration 
of complexity through interdisciplinary 
approaches (Ray and Grassle, 1991; 
Allen and Hoekstra, 1992; Grumbine, 
1994; Christensen et al., 1996; Mangel 
et al., 1996). Here is where we run into 
an insurmountable problem (Ludwig 
et al., 1993; Salwasser, 1993). Science 
has great difﬁculty reassembling the 
parts of nature that scientists study by 
combining the information of each of 
the distinct disciplines (the Humpty 
Dumpty syndrome: Nixon and Kremer, 
1977; Dunstan and Jope, 1993; Regal, 
1996; Fowler and Hobbs, 2002). Yet 
we need a combination of integrative 
and reductionistic approaches (Ray and 
Grassle, 1991); we need a way in which 
reductionistic management questions 
can be treated in a fully holistic way 
through or using reductionistic science. 
It is beyond the scope of science, as 
conventionally used, to provide realistic 
guidance that places appropriate impor-
tance on each factor in the full suite of 
elements involved in complexity. We are 
limited by the fact that complexity, as 
known through our knowledge of frag-
mented pieces, cannot be reconstructed 
in anthropogenic models. The unknown 
cannot be included in conventional or 
traditional approaches, regardless of 
how important it is. We cannot use an-
thropogenic synthetic models, concepts, 
theories, or hypotheses to represent full 
reality; it is impossible (Bateson, 1972, 
1979).
Does this mean that science cannot be 
involved in providing guidance? Guid-
ance, at least of the conventional kind, 
seems out of the question. However, we 
are not relieved of the need to ﬁnd guid-
ance and, if science can lead us to the 
proper information, it must come from 
what science can do.
Does guiding information come from 
the other three roles of science? Indeed 
it can, and the key to circumventing 
the limitations of science is integrating 
Tenet 3 into management to get guid-
ance as directly as possible from reality 
itself. What we see as the patterns de-
scribable by science are emergent from, 
and account for, complexity based on 
our understanding of complex systems. 
As will be seen below, in the process of 
combining the requirements of Tenet 3 
with those of Tenet 7, the third role of 
science (describing natural variation) 
solves the problem presented by the 
reductionistic limits of science (a long-
recognized problem, Bateson, 1972; 
Thorpe, 1974; Bartholomew, 1982; 
Allen and Starr, 1982; Rosenberg, 1985; 
Brown, 1994, 1995). Science exposes 
the source of guiding information, and 
using that information also achieves 
the goal of consistency. In many con-
ventional approaches we would attempt 
to combine related information to be 
interdisciplinary. To fully account for 
complexity, all information from all 
possible disciplines of science would 
be combined. Because of the unknown, 
human limitations, and the requirements 
Systemic management applies in any habitat, ecosystem, or community, 
exempliﬁed by marshes, lakes, or ocean basins. The list includes terrestrial 
systems (species, communities, populations, species, and ecosystems) such as 
prairies where the black-tailed jack rabbit, Lepus californicus, occurs (Photo 
courtesy of, and copyright by: Bruce Fowler).
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of Tenets 1–3, this is impossible. How 
do we use the products of science to 
meet the need for an interdisciplinary 
approach to account for complexity 
through scientiﬁc efforts? We are back 
to the promise of the information con-
tent and integrative nature of emergent 
patterns.
It is clear that, despite the inadequacy 
of the conventional uses of science 
to represent reality and deal with 
complexity, the combination of risks 
(along with the combinations of the 
other elements of complexity) must be 
brought to bear in providing guidance 
for decision-making and management 
and thus meet the requirements of all 
nine tenets (Table 1, Appendix 2). The 
repetitive appearance of the concept of 
“combinations” above is behind advice 
to make management interdisciplin-
ary (Ray and Grassle, 1991; Allen and 
Hoekstra, 1992; Grumbine, 1994; Chris-
tensen et al., 1996; Mangel et al., 1996). 
The alpine terrain preferred by mountain goats, Oreamnos americanus, exempliﬁes the importance of micro-habitat 
and the diverse requirements of species in their roles in various ecosystems—all part of the complexity important to 
management (Photo supplied by, and copyright by: Charles Fowler).
Achieving an interdisciplinary approach 
is often subsumed in the concept of 
holism (Franklin, 1993b; Moote et al.2), 
especially in the move toward including 
ecosystems in management schemes. It 
is even more often thought of as a matter 
of bringing scientists (or others) together 
in collaborative use of the information 
that they have to offer.
However, we have already seen that 
bringing any group of stakeholders 
together (scientists or otherwise) in an 
interdisciplinary effort fails to do three 
things. First, such groups fail to exhaust 
the list of elements and factors that 
should be brought to bear (there will 
always be unknowns and other forms 
of uncertainty — Tenet 2). Second, it is 
impossible to ﬁnd consensus on what 
the relative importance of various fac-
tors might be (and if consensus is found 
there is no guarantee that the conclusion 
is not wrong). In conventional or tradi-
tional management, factors seen as less 
important are often relegated to details 
that will be taken into account later, 
when we get a better set of information. 
However, procrastination may be to our 
peril, and we may never get what we 
want in traditional approaches. Third, it 
is impossible to combine the informa-
tion that science produces (even if we 
knew all factors to be taken into account 
and their relative importance) to get a 
collective consideration of everything 
(Cairns, 1991). This limitation of sci-
ence has long been recognized (Bateson, 
1972; Thorpe, 1974; Bartholomew, 
1982; Allen and Starr, 1982; Rosenberg, 
1985; Allen and Hoekstra, 1992; Brown 
1994, 1995 (again the Humpty Dumpty 
syndrome of human limits mentioned 
above)), but this limitation has not been 
taken into account in traditional forms 
of management.
The use of models historically pro-
vided hope for progress, but it is now 
recognized that models make only a 
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Various species (such as the arctic fox, Alopex lagopus, St. Paul Island, Alaska) have isolated populations on islands. Many 
species, including foxes, have been intentionally introduced to islands resulting in changes in the ﬂora and fauna. Effects 
of introductions on ecosystems are of note but are not fully considered in conventional management (Photo supplied by: 
Charles Fowler, NMFS).
small step in the right direction while 
never reaching the destination. Models 
help appreciate and understand complex-
ity, but they are not the reality needed 
(Bateson, 1972). Models perform won-
derfully in reinforcing our notion that 
it is important to consider complexity, 
and they help us to understand some of 
things that we would include if we could 
produce a full representation of reality; 
however, models (like words) are only 
superﬁcially representative and not the 
thing they represent. Our weighting of 
the relative importance of various factors 
in our models is often arbitrary compared 
to the weightings realized in nature. 
Whether they be statues, photographs, 
scale models (e.g. airplanes, rivers, or 
estuaries), computer simulations, equa-
tions, or theories and concepts, they do 
not encompass the full scale of reality 
(Bateson, 1972; Jørgensen et al., 1999; 
McIntyre, 1998); just one example of this 
is the incompleteness of the entire ﬁeld of 
mathematics, as represented in Gödel’s 
theorem (Gödel, 1931; Makous, 2000).
Thus, the concept behind interdis-
ciplinary consideration (holism) is, 
in principle, an essential element of 
management. It is simply one of several 
inadequacies of science that we cannot 
unite the information from the parts that 
we study in individual scientiﬁc disci-
plines. When it comes to meeting the 
needs of management in conventional 
approaches; the unknown is always ig-
nored. However, the need to include an 
accounting of everything persists as one 
of the fundamental requirements of the 
management for which we are striving. 
Tenet 5 must not be lost in its overlap 
and interrelationship with other tenets.
Nor should Tenet 5 be ignored be- 
cause it seems impossible in view of 
our experience with conventional think-
ing and management. There is danger 
in interpreting the partiality of science 
as a frustration to live with, rather than 
a basis for, moving to a completely dif-
ferent form of management. If change 
is needed, we need to know it, accept 
it, and look for something different. 
In consideration of Tenets 1 and 2 
above, repeated mention was made 
of the importance of accounting for 
everything collectively. We may need 
to change our ways in order to do so. 
Using the strengths of science in their 
reductionistic focus on emergent pat-
terns so as to get a direct match between 
management question and empirical 
observation is emerging as a way for-
ward (Tenet 6).
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The hookworm (female Uncinaria lucasi in this photo) is known to have a direct 
inﬂuence as a parasite on both northern fur seals, Callorhinus ursinus, and Steller 
sea lions, Eumetopias jubatus. The tradeoffs among the effects of parasites and 
competition from other consumers, as well as the synergistic interactions involved, 
are largely ignored in conventional management, even though they contribute to the 
patterns observed in ecosystems (Photo courtesy of: Frank Morado, NMFS).
Tenet 6: Management Must Be 
Based Upon Information, Including 
the Products of Scientiﬁc Research, 
Monitoring, and Assessment.
The principle behind Tenet 6 (Chris-
tensen et al., 1996; NRC, 1999) is that 
information (some of which is acces-
sible to science) is an inherent part of 
nature. Our measures of processes, 
relationships, structures, and patterns 
all provide information that is useful 
in addressing directly related manage-
ment questions. Emergent patterns are 
products of complexity to both account 
for complexity and represent useful in-
formation. Science provides the tools to 
access information so that it is available 
for practical application.
The third role of science in manage-
ment (providing advice: Tenet 5) requires 
the production of information critical to 
management. However, science is ham-
pered in providing that information (van 
Dobben and Lowe-McConnell, 1975; 
Walters, 1992; Ludwig et al., 1993; Sal-
wasser, 1993; NRC, 1999) because it is 
impaired by human limitations. In view 
of the difﬁculties facing us in meeting 
the challenges of dealing with complex-
ity, it may be necessary to look to science 
for information that differs from that 
currently used (NRC, 1999: “. . . science 
. . . must be tapped to develop new tools 
for observing and managing . . .”). We 
continue to need information; indeed, the 
lack of information (ignorance) is often 
found at the roots of mismanagement 
(Smith, 1977; Carpenter, 1995). This 
includes the inadequate consideration 
of things that cannot be known.
If science cannot discover everything, 
how can the unknown be part of the 
complexity to be taken into account by 
using science? Can science be involved 
in a way that takes advantage of its re-
ductionistic nature and simultaneously 
account for complexity? Can this be 
done when monitoring, measuring, and 
discovering seem to be the only sources 
of information? Tenet 6 emphasizes the 
importance of these aspects of science 
and the progress necessary in adhering 
to Tenet 3. Documenting, measuring, 
and describing emergent patterns con-
sonant with management questions 
becomes an option.
Science is frequently asked to provide 
monitoring information that can be used 
in management decisions. Monitoring 
appears in the titles of many papers 
(Agee and Johnson, 1988; Johnson and 
Agee, 1988; Noss, 1990b; Cairns, 1991; 
Munn, 1993; Noss, 1993; Woodley, 
1993; Wood, 1994; Christensen et al., 
1996; Grumbine, 1997). Often the need 
identiﬁed is simply for information (usu-
ally scientiﬁc) or knowledge (Mooney 
and Sala, 1993; Moote et al.2), or oc-
casionally pointing out the inadequacy 
of what we have (Agee and Johnson, 
1988; Cairns, 1991; Huntley et al., 1991; 
Walters, 1992; Mooney and Sala, 1993; 
Carpenter, 1995; Naiman et al., 1995; 
Christensen et al., 1996; NRC, 1999).
How is monitoring useful? Science 
is crucial for evaluation of progress in 
achieving management objectives (Tenet 
7). How else can we know if the actions 
that we take in management result in our 
species, other species, ecosystems, or 
the biosphere falling within their normal 
ranges of natural variation (Tenets 3, 7)? 
We can only know the answers to such 
questions if we have ways of studying 
things in regard to their natural variation 
and ways of comparing current states 
with standards and goals, especially 
for things over which we have control 
(Tenet 8). This concept, for example, is 
central to the practice of medicine. How-
ever, we still need information that can 
be used to set management goals and ob-
jectives (Tenet 7). Can science provide 
such information through monitoring? 
Observations provide information on 
the limits to natural variation of potential 
use in the implementation of Tenet 3.
While science itself may not suf-
fice to synthesize partially related 
information effectively (combine, 
assign relative weights, unite, or put 
“Humpty Dumpty” back together 
again, in models, theories, or concepts 
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(Dunstan and Jope, 1993; Regal, 1996; 
Fowler and Hobbs, 2002)), scientiﬁc 
information remains of critical value. 
It is of critical importance that science 
be used to produce information that can 
be used in guiding our decision making. 
We need any information that can be 
brought to bear in ways that adhere 
to the other tenets. Such information 
makes up a key part of the basis for 
management and, adhering to Tenet 2, 
management must use such information 
for each management question before 
us. This information is produced by 
monitoring, observing, describing, and 
documenting — the things that science 
can do, especially in providing informa-
tion on the limits to natural variation.
Perhaps of most importance, therefore, 
is the role of science in deﬁning observed 
limits to natural variation — discovering, 
describing, and measuring emergent 
patterns to adhere to Tenet 3 where the 
pattern observed is directly consonant 
with the management question (same 
dimensions, temporal and spatial scales, 
and of identical logical types). Insofar 
as such patterns are emergent from the 
complexity of reality, they account for 
complexity (automatically (Fowler and 
Crawford, 2004), thereby circumventing 
the reliance on conventional uses of sci-
ence and their problems).
Each discipline of science can be 
viewed as involving the proper group of 
people from whom we should get infor-
mation regarding the limits to the natural 
variation of what they study. From such 
work, especially through comparative 
studies, the kinds of variation observed 
in natural systems can be observed, doc-
umented, and measured. With this kind 
of information across time, across space, 
and over various systems, we begin to 
appreciate the natural limits to such 
variation in correlation with environ-
mental circumstances and the qualities 
of the various species involved — one of 
the main products of scientiﬁc research 
(exempliﬁed by the growing science of 
macroecology and the observation of 
macroecological patterns; Brown, 1995; 
Gaston and Blackburn, 2000). Identiﬁ-
cation of the risks of exceeding such 
limits is also of help, but more in terms 
of added contributions to our knowledge 
of the complexity of factors that impose 
limits than in terms that can directly be 
brought to bear in management through 
conventional approaches.
Tenet 7: Management Must Be 
Guided by Clearly Deﬁned and 
Measurable Goals and Objectives.
The management of our use of re-
sources relies on directly relevant guid-
ing information in objective metric form 
that measures the difference between 
current and desirable circumstances 
in order to identify problems, guide 
change, and achieve progress (Chris-
tensen et al., 1996; NRC, 1999). These 
scientiﬁc measures of natural systems 
must be received in useful forms. The 
value of information to humans is 
realized only if it can be translated to 
management objectives to be achieved 
with directions and actions to be taken. 
In principle, we can manage only if we 
know what to do; we cannot manage 
properly if we do not have goals. We 
need clear measures of existing prob-
lems, especially problems that can be 
solved through management.
Management is goal driven (Inter-
agency Ecosystem Management Task 
Force, 1995) and its implementation is 
aimed at achieving those goals (Salwas-
ser et al., 1993). We must know where 
we are going and what we want the 
results to be. We need guidance (Toman, 
1993), criteria, standards (Schaeffer and 
Cox, 1992), benchmarks (Angermeier 
and Karr, 1994), or landmarks (Eh-
renfeld, 1993). Normative or baseline 
information is critical (Soulé, 1985; 
Norton, 1987; Agee and Johnson, 1988; 
Rapport, 1989, 1992; Patten, 1991; 
Callicott, 1992; Costanza et al., 1992; 
Page, 1992; Angermeier and Karr, 1994; 
Davis and Simon, 1994; Maerz, 1994; 
Christensen et al., 1996).
Without goals, mistakes are virtually 
guaranteed. Without consistent goals 
(goals for the variety of management 
questions that are consistent with each 
other, Tenet 1), it is easy to under- or 
over-emphasize human elements (e.g. 
human institutions, value systems, 
designs, economic considerations) or 
human nature. This can lead to serious 
mistakes. Without objectives, it is easy 
to encounter unforseen risk; we cannot 
proceed without knowing where we 
are going (Tenets 1 and 4). There must 
be clearly deﬁned goals and objectives 
(Christensen et al., 1996; NRC, 1999). 
If these goals are not quantitative, it 
is difﬁcult to measure progress, to see 
the change needed in order to achieve 
success, or to evaluate problems to be 
solved.
Only by knowing precisely what the 
objectives are, can science be used to 
measure progress. Science is critical 
(Tenet 6) in producing the information 
to establish goals and objectives at the 
outset. In this process, science is re-
stricted to observation and measuring 
variation so that Tenet 3 can be applied. 
This restriction occurs because (as re-
viewed above) science cannot combine 
partially related information from its 
various disciplines to represent reality 
in a way that is adequate for manage-
ment. The interdisciplinary approach 
is misleading if we try to combine 
partially or indirectly related informa-
tion in an attempt to recreate reality. 
Nevertheless, Tenet 6 (in combination 
with Tenets 1 and 2) requires that we 
have an approach that takes account of 
what we would have if it were possible 
to reconstruct reality from all the parts 
to be studied.
While the tenets of management help 
rule out optional forms of management, 
we are still without a clear understand-
ing of how management can proceed in 
meeting them collectively. Does adher-
ing to Tenet 3 provide guidance that 
satisﬁes the needs identiﬁed in Tenets 1 
and 2? How is complexity accounted for 
by information on, and ﬁtting within, the 
normal range of natural variation?
Natural patterns are products of, or 
emergent from, complexity — as an in-
tegration of complexity. All factors are 
involved in this emergence and include 
those that are currently unknown to us. 
Natural patterns have their explanation 
in all of the factors that contributed to 
their formation. As such, natural patterns 
are integral. Thus, the use of empirical 
information on patterns directly related 
to each management question solves 
what appears to be an insurmountable 
problem. (This will be discussed further 
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below, see also: Fowler et al., 1999; 
Fowler and Hobbs, 2002; Fowler and 
Crawford, 2004). Complete consonance 
between guiding information and man-
agement issue is achieved only when 
they are both in the exact same units or 
dimension.
Management goals must include 
long-term objectives (Alpert, 1995) and 
benchmarks relevant to broad spacial 
scales. It is important to include the 
elements of complexity (Tenet 2) that 
involve all temporal and spacial scales. 
Just as it is important to not abandon 
single-species considerations, it is also 
important that we not abandon short 
time scales in achieving sustainability 
(Tenet 4); goals should include not only 
the short-term but also the long-term. 
This needs to include geological and 
evolutionary time scales so as to deal 
with risks (Tenet 4) such as extinction. 
Short-term goals cannot be forgotten, 
but focus on them has been part of the 
pathology identiﬁed in traditional forms 
of management (Holling and Meffe, 
1996). Historically, management has 
focused on short-term issues to the rela-
tive exclusion of the long-term. Again, 
there must be attention paid to the rela-
tive importance of long- vs. short-term 
goals (Tenet 2) so there is consistency 
(Tenet 1).
Temporal scale is also important in 
regard to goals and objectives as they 
relate to levels of biological organiza-
tion (hierarchical scale). For example, 
there must be endpoints toward which 
we want ecosystems to return (Rap-
port, 1989; Clark et al., 1991; Patten, 
1991; Costanza et al., 1992; Davis and 
Simon, 1994; Schramm and Hubert, 
1996), especially so that they fall within 
the normal ranges of natural variation 
(Tenet 3) in the various ways they can 
be measured. These may involve a great 
deal of time, including evolutionary 
time scales.
It may seem that the more tenets and 
principles we consider, the worse the 
challenges become. Tenet 1 must be 
adhered to in the process of providing 
goals — there cannot be conﬂict between 
goals for biomass consumption at the 
single-species level and those at the 
ecosystem level. Tenet 4 must also be 
imposed so that our goals clearly avoid 
risk. Tenet 3 must be followed to allow 
for the use of information produced by 
science.
Science can provide information 
regarding the variation observed for 
other species, ecosystems, or systems 
of other hierarchical orders. This pushes 
the frontiers of management toward 
greater complexity by allowing for as-
sessment of ecosystems. This informa-
tion would give us norms and standards 
against which to evaluate such systems, 
including human systems (Costanza 
et al., 1992; Davis and Simon, 1994; 
Schramm and Hubert, 1996). It would 
allow for including Tenet 3 in combi-
nation with Tenet 7 because we could 
establish goals in which ecosystems, 
communities, processes, the biosphere, 
populations, organs, or individuals 
would fall within the normal range of 
natural variation (Callicott, 1992). At 
least a partial combination of Tenets 2, 3, 
5, 6, and 7 is beginning to look possible. 
However, some aspects of meeting these 
requirements seem impossible. How do 
we distinguish the impossible from the 
possible? Is there a way for the remain-
ing tenets and their associated principals 
to provide some guidance?
Tenet 8: Management Must 
Be Carried Out in a Way That 
Recognizes That Control over 
Other Systems (e.g. Species and 
Ecosystems) is Mostly Impossible.
Nature is complex and intercon-
nected. To every action there is a set of 
reactions. Preventing such reactions is 
rarely, if ever, under our control, and 
it is impossible to change the fact that 
they occur. We cannot avoid or alter 
the laws of nature, nor can we alter 
the realities upon which the principles 
behind the tenets of management are 
based. There may be some control over 
the extent of our inﬂuence but not the 
fact that we have inﬂuence with all of 
its repercussions.
It is often said that we cannot manage 
ecosystems (Lackey, 1995–96; Mangel 
et al., 1996; Schramm and Hubert, 
1996; NRC, 1999), we can only manage 
people (Cairns, 1991; Christensen et al., 
1996; Mangel et al., 1996; NRC, 1999). 
The wisdom of this statement is seldom 
integrated into management. Our con-
trol over other factors is more limited 
(Stanley, 1995) than our control over 
ourselves (Bateson, 1972). Our only 
option is to manage ourselves (Cairns, 
1991; Ehrenfeld, 1993; Christensen et 
al., 1996; Mangel et al., 1996) knowing 
that, even in making choices, there are 
limits to our control.3 We experience 
the lack of control in our daily lives; 
it is part of the exercise of coaching 
managers of businesses (O’Neil, 1999), 
and it is true for ecosystems and other 
species. We can inﬂuence other species 
or ecosystems but we cannot control 
them. We can facilitate the results that 
we want in regard to ecosystems, but 
we cannot make them happen (Francis 
et al., 1999).
Very importantly, we have no control 
over the fact that there are second-
ary (and other higher order) effects 
of our inﬂuence; we cannot avoid the 
“Law of Unintended Consequences” 
(Tenner, 1996; Rohman, 1999; Gillon, 
2000; Lueck, 2000). This is part of 
dealing with complexity (Tenets 1 and 
2). When we inﬂuence another system 
(e.g. another species), we cannot con-
trol the fact that there will be second-
ary reactions, domino effects, or side 
effects — including those that come back 
to haunt us (feedback), often after long 
delays. We cannot avoid such systemic 
reactions. Every attempt to mitigate 
such reactions has its own effects rather 
than really solving problems. Even 
controlling ourselves will result in con-
sequences. The game of management is 
that of choosing self control (intransi-
tive management) so as to do the best 
job possible to ensure the likelihood of 
desired outcomes.
Traditional management often em-
bodies the assumption that control 
over the nonhuman is an option. More 
generally, it is assumed that we have 
more control over the other-than-self 
than is possible. At the species level, 
this is exempliﬁed by trying to place 
constraints on populations of other spe-
3 The serenity prayer applies (“God grant me the 
serenity to accept the things I cannot change, 
the courage to change the things I can, and the 
wisdom to know the difference.”).
65(2) 25
cies so that they purposely occur outside 
the normal range of natural variation to 
increase productivity; these changes are 
the goal. The MSY concept embodies an 
intent to maintain resource populations 
at reduced levels (e.g. one-half of mean 
normal levels using the logistic model 
of population dynamics, or 40% typical 
of ﬁsheries management; Restrepo et al., 
1998). As we are seeing, this is no longer 
an option because it does not account for 
genetic effects, effects of such reduc-
tions on other species, ramiﬁcations for 
the rest of the ecosystem, age structure, 
extinction, life history strategy, feedback 
. . . complexity. Humans cannot con-
struct models from selected indirectly 
related elements to undertake a complete 
consideration of such complexity.
In spite of the lessons from history, the 
philosophy behind the MSY approach is 
carried forward in many attempts to 
deﬁne “ecosystem management.” Such 
control is still seen as an option, perhaps 
modiﬁed somewhat, while focusing on 
the ground gained in considering com-
plexity by extension of manipulative 
approaches to ecosystems (e.g. modern 
agriculture). Management is clearly 
“human effort to control or direct some 
entity” (Schramm and Hubert, 1996) and 
the very term “ecosystem management” 
connotes such control (as do the terms 
“resource management,” “predator con-
trol,” and “pest management”).
Efforts to avoid this problem have 
been expressed by using terms such 
as “ecosystem-based” management 
(NRC, 1999). The tendency to think in 
terms of control are clearly identiﬁed 
in the pathology of conventional forms 
of management by Holling and Meffe 
(1996). In the end, it is we who are 
more controlled by the systems upon 
which we depend, and of which we are 
a part (Salthe, 1985; O’Neill et al., 1986; 
Koestler, 1987; Wilber, 1995; Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002), than the reverse.
Tenet 8 provides relief from a grow-
ing burden; it reduces the realm of 
options for management considerably. 
Applying this tenet means that we do 
not have to try to control any other spe-
cies, ecosystem, biosphere, community, 
or landscape to ensure that any of these 
return to within their normal range of 
natural variation, or to meet our short-
term needs (Tenet 3). We are (or would 
be) making a mistake to try. The most 
reasonable management questions are 
those that are framed in terms of what 
we can do or change about ourselves 
(including, now, humans as a species). 
Physical factors, such as ice in marine systems at high latitudes (here in the Antarctic), are among the elements to be taken into 
account in management involving ecosystems (Photo courtesy of, and copyright by: Larry Hobbs, Inland Whale).
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When inﬂuence on the nonhuman is 
the issue, the question must always be 
asked in terms of what is a sustainable 
level of inﬂuence — the inﬂuence to 
which we would confine ourselves. 
All species have such inﬂuence. Im-
portantly, influences are among the 
things that can be measured and ob-
served to be limited in their variability 
(i.e. we see balance within the normal 
ranges of natural variation for such 
inﬂuence, Tenet 3, Fowler and Hobbs 
2002, 2003). Relationships are part 
of complexity, and our relationships 
with other species, ecosystems, and 
the biosphere are at stake in appropri-
ate management. Human relationships 
with the environment need to be within 
the normal range of natural variation 
observed in the relationships between 
other species and the same aspects of 
their environment.
The issue at stake here involves one of 
the ways where existing (conventional or 
traditional) approaches to management 
get into trouble. The concept of MSY, 
for example, is based on the premise that 
we can control a resource population’s 
size so as to elicit a density-dependent 
response such that increased productiv-
ity is made available for human use. The 
error in this thinking is not in the belief 
that the density-dependent response 
will occur, for it usually does. Nor is it 
erroneous to believe that we can make 
a change in which the population is 
reduced (an inﬂuence which we and 
other species have). Such reductions 
usually occur.
Rather, the error is in the belief that 
such management provokes no other 
effects (e.g. reactions by other species, 
altered evolutionary pressures, changes 
in community composition), or that such 
effects are of insigniﬁcant or negligible 
importance. We have no control over the 
occurrence of other effects and they will 
always occur, many so subtle as to be 
unmeasurable. However, they remain of 
collective importance, often in the form 
of risks that we wish to avoid. To deal 
with complexity (Tenets 1 and 2), all 
such effects must be acknowledged and 
accepted as beyond our control — they 
cannot be avoided.
The way around this problem is to 
deﬁne our actions as inﬂuence rather 
than control. In this way, control is 
maximized in terms of regulation of 
what we are and what we do, not only 
as individuals but also as a species 
(i.e. whether it be our population size, 
consumption of biomass, production of 
CO2, or consumption of energy). We 
then look for information that can be 
used to guide our inﬂuence and make 
use of science (Tenet 6) to find the 
information that can be employed in 
a way that adheres to all of the tenets 
of management. This helps deﬁne the 
“best available science” as required for 
decision-making by U.S. law.
Management itself then becomes one 
of controlling our inﬂuence (Cairns, 
1991; Christensen et al.,1996; Mangel et 
al., 1996; NRC, 1999). We regulate our 
inﬂuence, neither setting it at zero (both 
Tenets 3 and 9 prohibit such extremes) 
nor promoting too much (not exert-
ing inﬂuence above the normal range 
of natural variation, Tenet 3). Control 
then is best perceived as an option de-
ﬁned to be more a matter of regulating 
human inﬂuence (intransitive action) 
than controlling the nonhuman (transi-
tive action). As individuals, we cannot 
control our species because humans as 
a species are notoriously resistant to 
control when it comes to things like self 
determination, rights to bear children, 
Corals (exempliﬁed by the genus Anthomastus) are bottom dwelling 
organisms representing species that are parts of the marine ecosystems 
effected by commercial ﬁshing, whether taken directly as target species or 
subjected to incidental mortality as a result of ﬁshing practices. Both the 
direct and indirect effects of ﬁshing are to be accounted for in management 
in order to deal with the full set of factors involved (Photo courtesy of: 
David Barnard, ADF&G).
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and access to resources — all parts of 
the reality and complexity that must be 
dealt with in management.
There remains the question of wheth-
er or not such control can be realized 
in a combination of social, religious, 
legal, international, economic, and 
governmental action. As a species, the 
question becomes one of whether or not 
it is possible for our species to ﬁnd the 
means of exerting self control. If we fail 
to ﬁnd a means of self control, we have 
no control over how our unregulated 
or unconstrained inﬂuence will impact 
other elements of the complex systems 
in which we ﬁnd ourselves. There is 
feedback. There is stochasticity in these 
processes, and it must be acknowledged 
and considered in the list of elements 
that make up reality (Tenet 1). We must 
expect surprise (Christensen et al., 1996) 
whether we like it or not. Nevertheless, 
management would proceed in hopes 
that the majority of systemic reactions 
will be in our favor — at least work as 
well as they appear to have worked for 
other species (actually, for all other 
cases represented by the things that we 
see in their respective normal ranges of 
natural variation, Tenet 3). The empiri-
cal examples of sustainability seem to 
have worked, and controlling ourselves 
to mimic such successes is an option.
Tenet 9: Management Must 
Involve Humans and Their Role 
as Components of at Least Some 
Natural Systems.
In principle, humans are subject to 
the laws of nature, some of which are 
expressed over evolutionary and geologi-
cal time scales, as well as various spatial 
scales, as part of the complexity of reality 
(Munro and Holdgate, 1991; Mangel et 
al., 1996; Christensen et al., 1996; NRC, 
1999). Part of our existence is that of 
being a species and knowing that no spe-
cies is exempt from the laws of nature, 
including the fact that feedback is always 
part of the response to our inﬂuence. Ex-
cluding ourselves entirely (self-imposed 
extinction) is not a desirable option, even 
if it is through ignorance.
Removing humans entirely by com-
pletely prohibiting anthropogenic inﬂu-
ence is not an option for management. 
To do so would violate both Tenets 3 and 
4. We have not achieved sustainability 
for the human species as an element of 
biological systems if we argue that we be 
The prairie dog, Cynomys ludovicianus, is among the many species of the prairies of midwestern North 
America. It uses oxygen and breathes out carbon dioxide contributing to the composition of the atmosphere 
that is shared by all species and ecosystems in the biosphere. This kind of world wide interconnectedness 
is part of what is fully and automatically taken into account in systemic management regardless of the 
management question being addressed (Photo courtesy of, and copyright by: Bruce Fowler).
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Fungal communities are recognized as parts of various ecosystems and would be 
among the factors considered automatically in using systemically emergent patterns 
for guidance, whether for ﬁsheries, forestry, or agriculture. The fungus in this photo 
is Trichomaris invadens showing the fruiting body external to the host tanner crab, 
Chionoecetes bairdi, a species for which it is suspected that the fungus alters the 
molting process (Photo courtesy of: Frank Morado, NMFS).
removed completely. We have also failed 
if human extinction is a natural conse-
quence of our actions; we are subject to 
the feedback or reactions of the systems 
that we inﬂuence. Justiﬁcation for com-
pletely removing humans is one of the 
traps of management when it is focused 
on ecosystems or the biosphere to the ex-
clusion of considering individual species 
or individual organisms. Just as the loss 
of any species at the species level is not 
an event of sustainability (it is a normal 
process at the ecosystem and biosphere 
levels), neither is the removal of humans 
whether by consequences of our actions 
(feedback), or as directly intended.
Because extinction of species is a 
natural process, it is possible to argue 
that management at the ecosystem level 
could include the removal of humans; 
this may be a justiﬁed argument for 
some ecosystems or parts of the world 
(we have to address the question of how 
many ecosystems we should occupy). 
However, even though humans will 
eventually go extinct, to overtly try to 
remove humans as a species entirely is 
not consistent with the idea of sustain-
ability at the species level. One task 
before us is that of minimizing the risk 
of our extinction systemically by re-
ducing the contribution of ignorance to 
such an event as likely as it is to happen 
regardless of our efforts (Darwin, 1953; 
Mines, 1971; Lederberg, 1973; Jarvis, 
1978; Laughlin and Brady, 1978; Bate-
son, 1979; Hassan, 1981; Capra, 1982; 
Jenkins, 1985; Reed, 1989; Tudge, 1989; 
Eldredge, 1991; Ponting, 1991; Hern, 
1993; Boulter, 2002).
Considerable thought has gone into 
the issue of including humans in eco-
systems, landscapes, and the biosphere. 
Some of this effort was aimed at expand-
ing the complexity we account for in 
management by including ecosystems; 
some was to avoid excluding humans, 
but many references make clear the 
importance of humans as parts of eco-
systems (e.g. Agee and Johnson, 1988; 
McDonnell and Pickett, 1993; Pﬁster, 
1993; Salwasser et al., 1993; Grizzle, 
1994; Interagency Ecosystem Manage-
ment Task Force, 1995; Malone, 1995; 
Stanley, 1995; Christensen et al., 1996; 
Schramm and Hubert, 1996; Grumbine, 
1997; McCormick, 1999; NRC, 1999; 
Moote et al.2).
However, questions remain: how can 
we ﬁt in? Questions for management 
involve the extent to which humans can 
be a sustainable part of the biomass of 
ecosystems, use (and share) the energy 
passing through ecosystems, exploit 
other species, or occupy space. Our 
construction of roads, the size of our 
villages, and the extent of mining, lum-
bering, ranching, tourism, introductions 
of exotic species, ﬁre prevention, and 
hunting of ungulates must be considered 
(Patten, 1991). Any such list (e.g. Ap-
pendix 3) is the beginning of a list that 
moves toward complexity (Tenets 1 and 
2) but reminds us that we cannot com-
plete the list owing to human limits.
Were we capable of completing the 
list, however, the list would include, 
individually and collectively, all inﬂu-
ences we have on other systems (such 
as ecosystems: Franklin, 1993a). Some 
of these inﬂuences (especially the extent 
of many influences) are now being 
criticized (Ehrlich, 1987; Rapport, 
1989; Ray and Grassle, 1991; Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002, 2003) and it is clear 
that they need to be within the normal 
range of natural variation (Tenet 3) to be 
sustainable. Being part of nature means 
that we affect all natural systems as does 
every species and are likewise subject to 
the resultant feedback.
As with single-species approaches 
to the regulation of our use of natural 
resources, there are criticisms of our 
interactions and participation in nature 
in general; we don’t ﬁt in and the lack 
of ﬁt is exposed in observable abnor-
malities (Fowler and Hobbs, 2003). 
The difﬁculty of a full understanding 
of humans, especially of the human spe-
cies as a component of natural systems, 
comes from a long history of thinking 
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Viruses (such as this herpes-like virus in the antennal gland of a red king crab, 
Paralithodes camtschaticus) are known to exist in virtually every ecosystem. 
However, a full consideration of each and every individual viral “species” is not part 
of current management processes. A complete foundation for management would 
not ignore viral particles (exempliﬁed here by the two tiny dark spots at the tip of 
the arrow), the facility with which they are moved by air, water, or shipping, their 
inﬂuence in systems such as ecosystems, their importance in the dynamics of such 
systems, or their contributions to emergent patterns in such systems (Photo courtesy 
of: Frank Morado, NMFS).
otherwise (Pﬁster, 1993; NRC, 1999). 
A good part of the problem is a lack of 
accounting for complexity and the fact 
that we are subject to the complicated 
array or suite of forces that sets limits 
and poses risks (NRC, 1999; Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002). Sustainability is 
a requirement or goal that applies to 
humans as well as to other ecosystem 
components (NRC, 1999).
Questions regarding the extent of 
sustainable human inﬂuence are preva-
lent in management literature. For 
continued existence, humans clearly 
depend on ecosystems for services, 
materials, energy, and food as does 
every species. Humans are among the 
predators within ecosystems (Grizzle, 
1994); we consume resources in our 
harvesting of many other species. The 
ways we depend on ecosystems includes 
the production of livestock, vegetable 
materials, and wildlife for human con-
sumption, water, recreation, minerals, 
aesthetic experiences, pharmaceuticals, 
and timber, along with our dependence 
on ecosystems for normative informa-
tion and genetic resources (e.g. Lewis, 
1969; Christensen et al., 1999). This 
list is, again, partial but interminable 
owing to the complexity of reality. We 
acknowledge our multiple-use relation-
ship with our environment (Salwasser 
et al., 1993) as part of the fact that we 
are supported by ecosystems and the 
biosphere (Baron and Galvin, 1990; 
Christensen et al., 1996).
We pay lip service to the need to not 
exceed the limits of such use (Westman, 
1990; Salwasser et al., 1993) but fail 
to prevent such excesses (Fowler and 
Hobbs, 2003) and fail to treat other as-
pects of our inﬂuence. Complexity also 
has to do with the effects that we have 
on other elements of our environment 
(Ehrlich, 1987; Rapport, 1989; Baron and 
Galvin, 1990; Ray and Grassle, 1991; 
Christensen et al., 1996). These effects 
materialize as we harvest resources, pro-
duce carbon dioxide, take up space, in-
teract with other species, produce toxins, 
channel rivers, build dams and highways 
(Patten, 1991), or use energy: complexity 
again. The feedback from these effects is 
part of the complexity that contributes to 
risks, constraints, and limits (Fowler and 
Hobbs, 2002). Our use of ecosystems and 
the biosphere must count in the kinds of 
repercussions that are accounted for in 
management (Christensen et al., 1996; 
Mangel et al., 1996; NRC, 1999).
Anthropocentric views of manage-
ment focus on the importance of having 
options for using things from the sys-
tems around us. The basic argument is 
that humans deserve support and this 
support is to be guaranteed, insofar 
as possible, by adhering to Tenet 9. 
On the other hand biocentric views of 
management place more importance on 
the effects that we have in getting this 
support — the integrity of ecosystems, 
for example. We cannot be exclusively 
either anthropocentric or biocentric in 
our decision making (Terborgh, 1974; 
Francis, 1993; McDonnell and Pickett, 
1993; Salwasser et al., 1993; Stanley, 
1995; Christensen et al., 1996; Moote 
et al.2). The tension between anthropo-
centric and biocentric views (Carpenter, 
1995; Stanley, 1995; Christensen et al., 
1996) stems from the fact that we need 
to ﬁnd a balance between two sets of 
forces (Christensen et al., 1996).
The experience of conﬂict in ﬁnding 
a realistic balance results from our at-
tempts to ensure equitable consideration 
of the two opposing sets as elements of 
complexity based on conventional ap-
proaches. This conﬂict is parallel to the 
forces of nature. There are needs and 
there are effects of getting those needs 
met. These forces, identiﬁed in scientiﬁc 
studies, involve the complexity of the in-
teractions among the various species and 
their environments. However, we have 
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no way of objectively combining the in-
formation from the various disciplines of 
science that study these factors in order 
to place realistic relative importance on 
each of the individual component we 
are able to bring under consideration. 
Again, human limits prevent develop-
ing and considering a complete list, 
yet consideration of the complete list 
is required by Tenet 2. Again, carefully 
chosen empirical information (Tenet 3) 
emerges as a way of circumventing the 
seeming impasse.
Every species places demands on its 
supporting systems to ensure survival, 
and each demand produces effects (in-
cluding feedback that affects the spe-
cies). There has to be a form of balance 
between these forces, knowing that 
for almost all cases it will be anything 
but a static balance (Christensen et al., 
1996). These balances are seen in the 
resulting emergent patterns observed 
for other species when the management 
question involves species-level issues 
for us humans.
Thus, for humans to be part of sys-
tems, we see our way toward deﬁning 
goals (Tenet 7) regarding how to fit 
into these systems (e.g. ecosystems, 
the biosphere, or nature in general) as 
a species when we use other species as 
examples of what works. Where do we 
ﬁnd scientiﬁcally produced informa-
tion (Tenets 6 and 7) to show us the 
balance between the forces of nature 
behind anthropocentric views and the 
forces behind biocentric views so that 
we can strive to achieve it? We see the 
answers to this question embedded in 
the information (Tenet 6) concerning 
natural variation and its limits (Tenet 
3). This information provides guidance 
(Tenet 7). An option for management 
materializes in the combinations of 
tenets that otherwise seem to deﬁne the 
impossible.
One of the ways that humans must 
be included in ecosystems is embodied 
in human action — implementation of 
management must be done by humans 
(Agee and Johnson, 1988; McDonnell 
and Pickett, 1993; Salwasser et al., 
1993; Moote et al.2). The actions that 
we take are part of the dynamics of 
the ecosystems of which we are a part. 
Many references stress the importance 
of recognizing the complexity of human 
action. These involve cultural, social, 
religious, institutional, psychological, 
legislative, and political dimensions 
with different groups of people partici-
pating and cooperating (Ovington, 1975; 
Agee and Johnson, 1988; Lee, 1993b; 
Grumbine, 1997; Moote et al.2).
Various technologies, economics, 
needs, and values are part of the human 
system within ecosystems (Schramm 
and Hubert, 1996) whether it currently 
ﬁts or not. It is more important to include 
these elements in working toward objec-
tives (deﬁned by Tenet 3) than in deﬁn-
ing them. Scientiﬁc disciplines cannot 
make such decisions (Pﬁster, 1993); 
science is only one example of human 
systems that are limited by the inability 
to deﬁne objective relative importance. 
However, all human institutions must 
be involved, whether they be religious, 
psychological, economic, political, 
educational, or scientiﬁc. Each must 
cooperate in action to achieve manage-
ment goals. 
There is a distinction between setting 
and achieving goals. After incorporat-
ing Tenets 3 and 8 into management, 
we are left with human society being 
responsible for producing the informa-
tion regarding normal variation (obser-
vations through the work of scientists). 
This deﬁnes the science that is most 
useful in management. This information 
is then used to set the objectives. That 
is, we do not set objectives based on 
anthropogenic activities involving poli-
tics, religion, technology, economics, 
emotions, scientiﬁc models, or aesthet-
ics. Then management is taking action. 
Tenet 7 requires guidance for social 
decision making and action (Toman, 
1993). The models that we are left with 
are the models that we ﬁnd in nature to 
be observed in direct relation to manage-
ment questions (i.e. of identical units or 
dimensions, ﬁtting the logical type of the 
corresponding management question, 
achieving complete consonance).
In the end, we see that there is more to 
Tenet 9 than avoiding biocentric values 
that might preclude human participa-
tion in the biosphere. This is more than 
giving ourselves permission to be part 
of nature and seeing environmental-
ism as an effort to make that wrong. It 
is more than taking responsibility for 
ensuring that certain ecosystems and 
the biosphere can support us so that 
we can be part of nature. It includes 
responsibility for being sustainable, 
not expecting such systems to do more 
than they can, nor expecting support for 
what we have become or may want to 
be. Tenet 9 includes the matter of being 
sustainable. That means change if we 
are not sustainable now.
Management has to be integrated into 
the human context (Moote et al.2). In 
combining Tenet 9 with the other tenets, 
management includes various goals and 
objectives. These include those realized 
by allowing other systems to recover 
so as to support us by being free of 
abnormal human demands, effects, and 
impacts. Achieving sustainability means 
being sustainable, and functioning sus-
tainably, before everything else. Man-
agement of ourselves to ﬁt in sustainably 
takes precedence over the manipulation 
of nature (Francis, 1993). This is the 
challenge of management — to be part 
of the universe by ﬁnding our place in 
it (Swimme and Berry, 1994). Manage-
ment is the task of ﬁnding the balance 
that makes humans both supported by 
and supportable by the natural systems 
on which we depend (Terborgh, 1974; 
Lee, 1993b).
Other Considerations
The literature on management raises 
many other considerations. Most ﬁt into, 
or are parts of, the nine tenets listed in 
Table 1 and Appendix 2. However, there 
are several discrete points that deserve 
mention, at least brieﬂy, some of which 
could easily be translated to special 
tenets in their own right. These include 
the precautionary principle, the burden 
of proof, and human limitations.
The Precautionary Principle
The precautionary approach is an 
element of management associated with 
avoiding risk. The kinds of risk involved 
are often thought of as either risks as-
sociated with statistical uncertainty or 
risks stemming from the unknown or 
unknowable.
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Often, to be precautionary, a safety 
factor is applied. Safety factors are 
usually quite arbitrary in being guesses, 
judgements, products of specialists 
(either as individuals or groups), or 
based on synthetic models. The adjust-
ments are subject to bias and human 
limitations rather than a full or objective 
consideration of complexity. As argued 
above, a full consideration of complex-
ity is a logical impossibility in taking 
such approaches; the unknown cannot 
be represented objectively in manmade 
reconstructions based on partial, indi-
rectly related information. By adhering 
to Tenet 3, however, the risks of un-
certainty are conﬁned to measurement 
error; all other uncertainty, including 
the unknown are accounted for in the 
information integrated by natural pat-
terns (Fowler and Crawford, 2004).
Information regarding natural varia-
tion is based on our best and most direct 
perceptions of reality to take advantage 
of the greatest strength of science. This 
is its capacity to observe and measure 
patterns with reductionistic focus where 
the focus corresponds directly to spe-
ciﬁc management questions (Fowler 
et al., 1999; Fowler and Hobbs, 2002). 
Here, as discussed below, a critical as-
sumption is that we can achieve appro-
priate alignment between management 
questions and measurements scientists 
make. It is assumed that we can deﬁne 
the management question and ﬁnd the 
corresponding natural pattern so as to 
achieve complete consonance between 
the two. The observations involve pat-
terns measured in units identical to 
those of the management questions; 
both are of corresponding dimensions 
and the same logical type (Bateson, 
1972).
Burden of Proof
Related to the precautionary principle 
is the burden of proof (Wood, 1994; 
Holling and Meffe, 1996; Mangel et 
al., 1996; Dayton, 1998). Shifting the 
burden of proof is so important that it 
could easily have been included as a 
separate tenet. Basically, accepting the 
burden of proof means that we have to 
prove that what we want, or would like, 
or think is appropriate or advisable, is 
in fact a viable option. Thus, if we want 
Polar bears, Ursus maritimus, are among the high-latitude species affected by pollutants generated in agricultural activities at lower 
latitudes. These effects count among those humans have on a global scale along with those we have on individual animals (Photo 
courtesy of, and copyright by: Larry Hobbs, Inland Whale).
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to reduce a ﬁsh population to half of its 
normal level, we are required to prove 
that it does not increase or create risk, or 
does not have abnormal genetic effects 
on the population or the co-occurring 
populations of other species.
That we cannot deal with the com-
plexity involved and the impossibility 
of providing such proof in conventional 
management, has been a frustration 
rather than grounds for rejecting such 
approaches. In applying the nine tenets 
of management simultaneously, directly 
related information on empirically ob-
served successes is used to provide proof 
of what works, tenuous as that informa-
tion itself may be. In combination with 
Tenet 3 the burden of proof means that 
being outside the normal range of natu-
ral variation (Tenet 3) is not proof that 
what we are doing is acceptable; instead, 
it is to be interpreted more as proof that it 
is unsustainable. Empirical information 
from within the normal ranges of natural 
variation (accounting for correlative pat-
terns) is as close as possible to proven 
examples of sustainability (Fowler and 
Hobbs, 2002, 2003).
Human Limitations
Another point chosen for emphasis in 
the literature involves human limitations. 
These are manifest in the imperfection 
of science, our limited knowledge or 
information, and our incomplete para-
digms (Bateson, 1972, 1979; Thorpe, 
1974; Holt and Talbot, 1978; Allen 
and Starr, 1982; Bartholomew, 1982; 
Rosenberg, 1985; Agee and Johnson, 
1988; Allen and Hoekstra, 1992; Brown, 
1994, 1995; Christensen et al., 1996; 
McIntyre, 1998; Jørgensen et al., 1999; 
Makous, 2000). An attempt to address 
this issue is seen in the literature that 
calls for more stakeholder involvement 
in goal setting (e.g. Slocombe, 1993; 
Schramm and Hubert, 1996; Ostermeier, 
1998; Moote et al.2).
However, human limitations prohibit 
a full consideration of complexity either 
by individual specialists, or institutional 
consensus, with one exception. That 
exception is the matter of agreeing to 
follow guidance from patterns observed 
in natural systems as an integration of 
the complexity we wish to take into 
account — an integration that is impos-
sible otherwise. The consensus needed 
is that of accepting Tenet 3 and integrat-
ing it into management. Otherwise, we 
ignore human limitations to assume 
more control than is possible — a viola-
tion of Tenet 8.
The effects of the hierarchical nature 
of biological systems means that such 
control is beyond human endeavor 
(Salthe, 1985; O’Neill et al., 1986; 
Koestler, 1987; Wilber, 1995; Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002). This aspect of 
complexity has been recognized, and 
institutional change is usually suggested 
as a way to achieve effective manage-
The coyote, Canis latrans, exempliﬁes a species that often coexists with humans. The responses by non-human species to the 
presence of humans involves a variety of factors, many of which are not accounted for in conventional management but inherent to 
the complexity accounted for in systemic management (Photo courtesy of, and copyright by: Bruce Fowler).
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ment (Beissinger, 1990; Myers, 1993; 
Christensen et al., 1996; Rasmussen, 
1996; Moote et al.2). Thus, one of the 
institutional changes needed is a uni-
form acceptance of Tenet 3.
Humans are real and part of reality, 
but ﬁnite; our concepts, models, science, 
and representations are always partial. 
This principle was woven into several 
of the nine tenets listed above. An ad-
ditional tenet might require that any suc-
cessful form of management would ac-
count for the fact that we are proceeding 
with imperfect information, even in our 
most direct measures of the variability 
of anything that we subject to scientiﬁc 
study. The points made in the sections 
above embody the acknowledgment of 
the limits of science: we can’t know ev-
erything, models are partial, complexity 
is beyond perfect representation, scien-
tists cannot recreate reality (in models, 
concepts, theories, or disciplines — we 
can only observe it), and we have no way 
of placing objective relative importance 
on the parts of reality that we study. This 
is part of dealing with complexity and 
forces us to employ empirical informa-
tion as our best use of science and the 
attending strengths of its reductionism. 
Thus, empirical information from other 
species on their rates of consumption 
from a resource species (a community, 
an ecosystem, or the biosphere), produc-
tion of CO2, or population size directly 
address sustainability regarding these 
specific factors (and simultaneously 
accounts for all related factors).
In management that implements all 
nine tenets, the goals, objectives, and 
standards are observable in natural 
systems rather than being institution-
ally derived. However, carrying out 
management must involve institutions. 
Guiding information is emergent from 
complexity — not the deliberations of 
special interest groups, politicians, sci-
entists, religions, or blue ribbon panels. 
Nevertheless, the actions to be taken as 
management have to involve all human 
institutions (societies, governments, 
sciences, religions, environmental or-
ganizations, etc.). Humans are part of 
the systems in which we participate (we 
must consider ourselves that way: Tenet 
9), and being and doing what is neces-
sary is the responsibility of everyone, 
each organization, and every human 
institution.
Systemic Management
Accepting the tenets of management 
presented above is not trivial. Any form 
of management that does not meet all 
nine is inadequate and probably coun-
terproductive, or even misleading. Yet, 
the difﬁculty involved is emphasized by 
the seeming impossibility of adhering 
to any two or three of the nine tenets 
simultaneously. If there are tenets that 
have been ignored in the compilation of 
the nine presented here, the challenge is 
even greater.
One form of relief is found in the 
reduction of effort, time, and resources 
expended in the goal setting process 
when we avoid some of the processes 
so vulnerable to human limits. Science 
can be conﬁned to focus more on ﬁnd-
ing information consonant with speciﬁc 
management questions and less on tan-
gential information. This would involve 
more attention to problems that can be 
solved and less on the symptoms of 
clearly identiﬁable problems or proving 
that there are connections. Other institu-
tional efforts can be redirected from goal 
setting to managing; goals would be set 
by empirical information provided by 
the relevant science rather than exten-
sive meetings, debate, and deliberation. 
Much of what is done in setting goals 
for current management can be seen 
as wasteful and could be eliminated. 
Instead, effort can be diverted to the 
process of ﬁnding relevant management 
questions and conducting the science to 
study the directly consonant empirically 
observed patterns.
Further relief is found in Tenet 8. We 
do not have to try controlling things that 
we cannot control. We cannot change 
(control) the fact that altering the struc-
ture of atoms has consequences (some 
of which we have grown to both respect 
and abhor for their potential). Chemicals 
and chemical reactions are part of us and 
we depend on them; manipulating them 
can result in signiﬁcant consequences, 
only some of which are beneficial. 
Chemicals and their reactions are the 
basis for industries involving antibiot-
ics, pesticides, plastics, explosives, 
energy production, fertilizers, drugs, 
paints, etc. However, there are always 
inﬂuences and effects beyond what we 
intend: waste, marine debris, pesticide 
and antibiotic resistance, CO2 accumu-
lation, extinction, and pollution (and 
the reciprocity of feedback to humans; 
Colborn et al., 1997). Tenet 8 is based 
on the principle that there will always 
be ramiﬁcations that we do not want or 
could not foresee when we try to control 
ecosystems or the biosphere.
We are left with the option of re-
stricting control to ourselves as best 
we can. Regardless, we cannot avoid 
unintended consequences and there is 
rarely full guarantee that we will ac-
complish the desired results. However, 
avoiding the abnormal takes advantage 
of the empirical evidence indicating that 
the odds of achieving related goals will 
be in our favor. A huge burden is lifted 
when we realize that we are advised to 
restrict control to ourselves; we can stop 
trying to control (manipulate, design, or 
engineer) the nonhuman (other species, 
ecosystems, the environment). This 
relief involves a combination of both 
effort and risk; less effort is expended to 
result in reduced risks. The responsibil-
ity and accountability are clearly those 
of being and doing what we can. This 
involves the best set of intentions for 
both humans and other elements in the 
systems around us.
However, controlling ourselves 
means that we take the responsibility 
for correcting the cases where we ﬁnd 
ourselves to be abnormal or pathologi-
cal (outside the normal range of natural 
variation: Fowler and Hobbs, 2002, 
2003). We are conﬁned to this option 
(Tenet 8). Conventional management 
has resulted in many of the cases where 
we ﬁnd ourselves outside the normal 
range of natural variation. It is likely 
that there are cases where conventional 
management has created more problems 
than it has solved, especially in the long 
term, and over broad spatial scales. 
Many of these problems involve the 
nonhuman elements in our ecosystems, 
involve other systems, or are problems 
that will occur at other times. Because 
of the interconnected nature of complex 
34 Marine Fisheries Review
systems, however, these problems trans-
late to risks — including such things as 
the risk of our own extinction (Darwin, 
1953; Mines, 1971; Lederberg, 1973; 
Jarvis, 1978; Laughlin and Brady, 
1978; Bateson, 1979; Hassan, 1981; 
Capra, 1982; Jenkins, 1985; Reed, 1989; 
Tudge, 1989; Eldredge, 1991; Ponting, 
1991; Hern, 1993; Boulter, 2002). Can 
we adhere to all of the tenets of man-
agement collectively by changing to a 
form of management that solves such 
problems?
The nine tenets outlined above deﬁne 
systemic management (Fowler and 
Hobbs, 2002). Conversely, systemic 
management is a form of management 
that adheres to all nine tenets. Like all 
management, it is human action and 
change, now doing things sustainably, 
being sustainable, avoiding the abnor-
mal. Initially, it would involve a great 
deal of change to solve identifiable 
problems (Fowler et al., 1999; Fowler, 
1999; Fowler, 2002; Fowler and Hobbs, 
2002, 2003). However, change is a de 
facto implementation of management; 
change is a critical part of manage-
ment (see Christensen et al., 1996, and 
Moote et al.,2 regarding commitment to 
adaptability). In systemic management, 
change is based on the guidance pro-
vided by empirical information regard-
ing the limits of what works. Limits are 
applicable to each management question 
that we face (Fowler, 1999; Fowler and 
Perez, 1999; Fowler et al., 1999; Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002, 2003).
Systemic management involves 
individual people. At the individual 
level, systemic management is based 
on information on norms for blood 
sugar levels, body temperature, heart 
rate, and blood pressure as commonly 
seen in medical practice. However, 
even in examples like these, current 
management is usually carried out 
without simultaneous consideration of 
other levels of biological organization. 
Full systemic management includes 
interactions between individual people, 
other people, species, and ecosystems. 
Thus, including how individual humans 
are currently treated is a step toward 
sustainability (e.g. to avoid the risks of 
death) by being within (or “controlling” 
things to be within) the normal range of 
natural variation for body weight (e.g. 
Calle et al., 1999), food consumption, 
and other facets of what we are and do 
as individuals. However, this treatment 
is carried out without consideration of 
questions regarding the limits to which 
resources can be used to conduct such 
practices, or ultimate genetic effects. If 
such issues are ignored, we neglect the 
hierarchical nature of scale in not only 
biological complexity, but also in time 
and space.
The combination of Tenets 1 and 
9 require that management have its 
applications at the level of biological 
organization involving individual spe-
cies. Clearly we can go part way in 
managing our interactions with every 
other species by fitting within the 
normal ranges of natural variation for 
things like competition, predation, and 
evolutionary/coevolutionary inﬂuences. 
These represent species-by-species 
applications of systemic management 
that meet the requirements of the nine 
tenets. It is important to note that the 
most important single-species aspect of 
systemic management is its capacity for 
a focus on humans and what we can do 
as a species. In other words, systemic 
management meets the combination of 
Tenets 1, 8, and 9 by managing in a way 
that offers the option of ﬁnding sustain-
ability for the human species, and doing 
so in a way that the sustainability of all 
other species is simultaneously taken 
into account.
At the species level, information 
about things like mean body size, 
population size, and total consumption 
rates define the specific dimensions 
over which the normal range of natural 
variation among species can be found. 
At more aggregated levels (ecosystems, 
communities, landscapes, biosphere), 
we are restricted to evaluating and as-
sessing because control is out of our 
reach (Tenet 8). However, there is still 
a range of variation that is natural and 
normal — a range that allows for assess-
ment or evaluation. There are patterns 
and there are limits at all levels (Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002). At the levels of eco-
systems and the biosphere our manage-
ment questions are restricted to human 
inﬂuence, even though it is important to 
continue to ask assessment and monitor-
ing questions (Tenet 6).
Management that applies at the eco-
system level, then, is addressed through 
questions such as: How many species 
can we harvest, how much biomass can 
we take from each ecosystem, and how 
should we allocate our harvest among 
selected resource species? What por-
tion of the available resources should 
we leave for other species and their 
ecosystems? In systemic management, 
the answers are based on empirical 
information (produced by scientific 
research; e.g. Fowler, 1999; Fowler and 
Perez, 1999; and Fowler and Hobbs, 
2002, 2003 and the references therein) 
that shows the natural variation that is 
directly related to (i.e. having the same 
dimensions as, and being completely 
consonant with) each corresponding 
speciﬁc question. Our species has inﬂu-
ence on such systems, like all species 
have inﬂuence. We have the option of 
changing ours, but not theirs — even 
though their inﬂuence on the system will 
change, sometimes as we wish, some-
times in ways that we may dislike. Our 
goal is to stay within the natural limits 
observed for the variation among other 
species, that is, to ﬁt in.
Management based on empirical ob-
servation depends on information like 
that presented in Figures 1–3 (Fowler 
and Perez, 1999; Fowler, 2002; Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002, 2003). Systemic 
management is the conceptually simple 
matter of confining humans to posi-
tions within such distributions. Thus, 
central tendencies or statistical conﬁ-
dence limits deﬁne measurable goals, 
standards, or objectives (Tenet 7) when 
we use adequate and pertinent data sets 
measured so as to directly correspond to 
the units and dimensions of the manage-
ment questions. Owing to our historic 
inﬂuence, current data often fall short 
of being what we will ultimately need 
(Fowler, 1999; Fowler et al., 1999). It is 
not a difﬁcult task to illustrate the goals 
and objectives, when we have sufﬁcient 
and appropriate data — data that are 
often very difﬁcult to obtain.
In comparison to this conceptually 
simple idea, the extremely demanding 
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process of obtaining relevant data is far 
exceeded in difﬁculty by the implemen-
tation of systemic management. Change 
is not easy, especially the large changes 
often shown to be necessary. The imple-
mentation of such management may 
be impossible — beyond the capacity 
of human skill, will, and commitment. 
However, attempting such change is part 
of management (Christensen et al., 1996; 
Moote et al.2) and our responsibility.
At the species level, we are faced by 
facts similar to those faced by a drug 
addict, not least of which is the difﬁculty 
of change. If it is possible at all, it will 
have to be carried out by a variety of 
processes, including (but not conﬁned 
to) the current processes that we use in 
management: laws, regulations, educa-
tion (Agee and Johnson, 1988; Naiman 
et al., 1995), community participation, 
public involvement, institutional ac-
ceptance and participation (religious, 
ethnic, economic, and business institu-
tions), and social change. Importantly, 
it will have to involve individuals as 
parts of the systems in need of change. 
Finally, and very importantly, it will take 
a great deal of time.
Avoiding the abnormal (regaining 
and staying within normal ranges of 
natural variation) may seem conceptu-
ally simple, even sufﬁcient. However, 
some positions within the overall range 
of variation observed represent better 
options than others. This is because of 
the fact that everything is interrelated 
(Christensen et al., 1996; NMFS, 1999; 
Moote et al.2). Clearly, there is a prob-
lem to be solved if we, as a species, 
fall outside the normal range of natural 
variation observed for all other species. 
However, it is not necessarily the case 
that we have maximized our sustainabil-
ity simply by falling within the normal 
range of natural variation for all species. 
Here is where another element of Tenet 
9 comes into play.
As a matter of being part of reality, 
our species has characteristics such as 
mean body size and metabolic rate. 
There is more at stake in pointing out 
such characteristics than questions 
related to whether or not such character-
istics themselves are within the normal 
range of natural variation. For example, 
interrelatedness requires that we address 
questions about normal ranges of natu-
ral variation by comparing ourselves 
to other species with similar body 
size. Consider an even more speciﬁc 
example: if predation is related to body 
size, predation should be managed by 
directly taking body size into account. 
Thus, it is important to use species (such 
as marine mammals; Fowler and Hobbs, 
2002, 2003) of an average body size 
similar to that of humans to serve as 
role models when addressing questions 
such as how much biomass to harvest 
from marine resource species, species 
groups, ecosystems, or the entire marine 
environment (Fig. 3). Using correlative 
patterns in this way is another part of 
the matter of accounting for complexity 
(Tenet 2).
Systemic management uses em-
pirical information to adhere to all 
nine tenets above as described and 
explained in Fowler and Hobbs (2002) 
(see also Fowler, 1999; Fowler et. al., 
1999; Fowler and Perez, 1999). Such 
management applies broadly and con-
sistently (Tenet 1) at various levels 
of biological organization (e.g. our 
species interaction with other species, 
ecosystems, and the biosphere, Fig. 2; 
Fowler and Hobbs, 2003). Consistency 
is achieved when management is based 
on information from natural systems 
because the systems from which the 
guiding information is obtained are 
themselves internally consistent (Fow-
ler, 1999; Fowler and Perez, 1999; 
Fowler et al., 1999; Fowler and Hobbs, 
2002).
This photo shows a Chlamydia-like organism (margin indicated by arrow) inside 
a cell of its host the Dungeness crab, Cancer magister. Reproductive division is 
shown by the narrow neck containing a division centrum just above a mitochondrion 
of the host cell. The effects of species such as this, and the roles of microscopic 
organelles, count among the many unknowns that plague conventional management, 
but that are fully accounted for in systemic management (Photo courtesy of: Frank 
Morado, NMFS).
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We adhere to Tenets 1 and 2 auto-
matically and simultaneously because 
empirical information represent patterns 
that integrate the full suite of factors we 
wish to take into account (Fowler and 
Crawford, 2004). Reality is the source 
of information so that we are freed of the 
bulk of limitations and errors inherent 
in the artiﬁcial nature of anthropogenic 
models. Reality is the model (Ehrenfeld, 
1993; Noss, 1993; Angermeier and Karr, 
1994; Salzman, 1994; Fowler and Hobbs, 
2002) and our errors are largely conﬁned 
to the ways we measure, observe, and 
represent natural patterns in dimensions 
directly pertinent to each management 
question. However, a full accounting 
of complexity happens only if all man-
agement questions are addressed (our 
responsibility, Tenet 9), and we can ad-
dress only those we know of.
Thus, although still confined by 
human limits, systemic management 
makes signiﬁcant strides in minimiz-
ing their effects, the Achilles heel of 
conventional management. Basically, 
there are four processes where human 
limits are involved: 1) listing manage-
ment questions, 2) observing relevant 
information, 3) setting goals, and 4) 
carrying out management. Conventional 
management brings human limits to 
all four where setting goals, item 3, 
is particularly vulnerable. In systemic 
management human limits continue to 
prevent a full listing of management 
questions, item 1, and carrying out 
needed management, item 4, may prove 
to be beyond reach. However, deﬁning 
and observing relevant information, item 
2, and goal setting, item 3, are relieved 
of much of the error human limitations 
bring to conventional management.
Systemic management uses empirical 
information to account for complexity 
on all fronts. This happens by virtue of 
the ways each and every factor plays a 
role in determining where species occur 
in the patterns represented by distribu-
tions like those of Figures 1 and 2. Each 
and every factor is represented in pro-
portion to the magnitude of its inﬂuence 
(Fowler, 1999; Fowler and Perez, 1999; 
Fowler et al., 1999; Fowler and Hobbs, 
2002; Fowler and Crawford, 2004). Very 
importantly, the collection of factors 
involved is accounted for as a group. 
The combination is integrated much like 
Bayesian statistical methods integrate 
various sets of empirical information 
in the form of statistics and probability 
distributions (Fowler, 1999; Fowler and 
Perez, 1999; Fowler et al., 1999; Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002, and see below). Of 
perhaps most importance, those things 
unknown to us are included directly. 
The unknown, in systemic management, 
hampers our progress primarily in our 
Figure 1. — Frequency distributions among species showing the change needed by 
humans as management to achieve a position near central tendencies (e.g. means of 
the distributions, from Fowler and Perez, 1999, where original sources are listed): A) 
trophic level based on species from 95 insect-dominated food webs; B) consumption 
of biomass from the Georges Bank ecosystem by 24 species of marine mammals, 
sea birds, and humans; C) consumption rate of walleye pollock, Theragra chal-
cogramma, by vertebrate predators; D) geographic range size showing humans at 
70% of the Earth’s non-Antarctic terrestrial surface; E) density dependence for 64 
species of invertebrates, ﬁsh, birds, and mammals in ﬁve statistical categories (from 
A: positive and statistically signiﬁcant to E: negative and signiﬁcant at the 0.05 
probability level); F) Total, worldwide, biomass ingested (i.e. not including biomass 
used for combustion, construction, or other purposes) for humans and 63 species of 
mammals; G) energy consumption per unit area based on data for 386 species of 
mammalian primary consumers; H) annual carbon dioxide production.
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inability to think of all management 
questions.
Tenet 3 is a key element in systemic 
management. Management is achieved 
in action (such as reducing harvests 
of ﬁsh) to constrain humans so as to 
fall within the normal range of natural 
variation, to avoid the abnormal and 
pathological. This means falling in 
the vicinity of the central tendencies 
or within statistical conﬁdence limits 
(Fowler and Hobbs, 2003) of distribu-
tions such as those shown in Figures 
1–4. This avoids the collective risks 
(Tenet 4) that prevent the accumulation 
of species at the extremes (i.e. beyond 
the tails of the relevant probability dis-
tributions). Again, as with other aspects 
of complexity (Tenet 2), the collection 
of risks is accounted for with empirical 
information and each risk is represented 
in proportion to its inﬂuence — part of 
its importance.
Information (Tenet 5) is inherent to 
data such as displayed in Figures 1 and 
2, including the information in the ge-
netic code that contributes to what spe-
cies are and their positions within such 
distributions (Fowler and MacMahon, 
1982; Ehrlich, 1987). Thus, systemic 
management accounts for time scales 
(e.g. evolutionary time scales) beyond 
what are normally considered in current 
forms of management, which typically 
focus on a few years at most. Compo-
nents of complex systems (e.g. species 
in the biosphere) have survived the test 
of time, doing the things they do, with 
the characteristics that they have, to 
exemplify sustainability as best it can 
be observed — the sustainability that is 
the goal of management.
Science is critical in providing the 
information for the construction of 
distributions like those shown in Fig-
ures 1 and 2 (Fowler and Perez, 1999; 
Tenet 6). Clear (but temporally and 
spatially variable) objectives and goals 
are measurable in the form of the central 
tendencies of such distributions (Tenet 
7, but only when the data are adequate 
and appropriate by being representa-
tive of systems not subject to abnormal 
human inﬂuence; e.g. consumption rates 
from the biosphere shown in Fig. 3). 
Stochasticity (as part of reality, Tenet 
2) is accounted for in being an inherent 
part of such distributions. The limits to 
our control are accounted for in restrict-
ing management questions to those 
regarding human qualities and activities, 
especially influence and interactions 
Figure 2. — Species frequency distributions showing the change needed by humans 
as management to achieve a position near central tendencies (e.g. means of the 
distributions; from Fowler and Perez, 1999, where original sources are listed): A) 
Human consumption (harvest) of ﬁnﬁsh in the Bering Sea compared to that of vari-
ous species of marine mammals; B) The total populations of marine mammals in 
comparison to the total population of humans; C) The consumption of mackerel, 
herring, sand eel, and hake by marine consumers in the northwest Atlantic com-
pared to consumption (harvest) of the same species by humans (corresponding to 
the consumption of these species by dogﬁsh; D) The total populations of terrestrial 
mammals in comparison to the total population of humans; E) The consumption of 
lantern ﬁsh, lightﬁsh, anchovy, and hake by 33 species of marine birds in the eco-
system off the southwest coast of Africa compared to consumption (harvest) of the 
same species by humans; F) The combination of B and D above to show the human 
population (5.7 billion); G) The consumption of anchovy by 33 species of marine 
birds in the ecosystem(s) off the southwest coast of Africa compared to consump-
tion (harvest) by humans; H) The consumption of biomass by 33 species of marine 
birds in the ecosystem(s) off the southwest coast of Africa compared to consumption 
(harvest) by humans.
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(Tenet 8), whether they be with other 
species, ecosystems, or the biosphere, 
and whether for energy consumed, 
CO2 produced, genetic effects on other 
species, or consumption of resources. 
be done to support human participation 
in various systems (Tenet 9) rather than 
removing ourselves entirely.
There may be other principles to 
which we must adhere, and it is possible 
that management based on empirical 
information will not meet all of them. 
This remains to be seen. At this time, 
however, systemic management is argu-
ably the most likely way forward. As we 
examine existing forms of management, 
we ﬁnd that each one fails to meet one 
or more of the criteria substantiated 
above.
Adoption of the burden of proof is in-
herent to systemic management. If there 
is opposition (by political, economic, 
religious, or another special interest 
group), those presenting such opposi-
tion have the burden of proving that the 
alternatives they are suggesting will 
work better than those proven to work 
in nature. This proof will be difﬁcult, 
if not impossible, because of the need 
to establish this proof while simultane-
ously adhering to all of the tenets (and 
their foundational principals) laid out 
above. For example, a ﬁshery operating 
for 50 years with harvest rates outside 
the normal range of natural variation of 
consumption rates by other species has 
not met the test of sustainability over 
evolutionary or geological time scales. 
It will be especially difﬁcult (arguably 
impossible) to meet the combined 
requirements of the ﬁrst ﬁve tenets in 
attempts to prove that anything outside 
the normal range of natural variation 
is sustainable. No one would consider 
trying to prove that a body temperature 
of 41°C is sustainable for individual 
humans.
In the quest to consider complexity, it 
is important to revisit “ecosystem man-
agement” in view of the historical at-
tempts to formulate management at this 
level of biological organization. Ecosys-
tem applications of management based 
on empirical information (e.g. panel B 
of Fig. 1 and third panel of Fig. 3) are 
a crucial part of systemic management. 
The fact that the scope of applicability of 
systemic management includes ecosys-
tems is one of the major advantages over 
conventional approaches. It transcends 
any individual application to address 
Such lists are complex. Avoiding the 
lower limits of many species frequency 
distributions (e.g. minuscule rates of 
resource consumption or none at all) 
guarantees that we are doing what can 
Figure 3. — The frequency distribution of consumption rates for marine mammals 
showing consumption rates at a variety of levels of biological organization in com-
parison to the rate at which humans harvest biomass (from Fowler and Perez, 1999, 
where the original sources are listed). The top panel shows the natural variation 
in consumption of pollock as observed for six species of marine mammals in the 
Bering Sea in comparison to recent takes of pollock by commercial ﬁsheries (com-
pare to Fig. 1C). The second panel shows consumption of ﬁnﬁsh in the Bering Sea 
by 20 species of marine mammals compared to human harvests. Total biomass con-
sumption is shown for 20 species of marine mammals in the Bering Sea in the third 
panel, again compared to the take in commercial ﬁsheries which is predominantly 
pollock. Total biomass consumption for the entire marine environment is shown in 
the fourth panel for 55 species of marine mammals, here compared to the take of 
about 110 million t estimated as the harvest of biomass for human use in the late 
1990’s. Worldwide consumption of biomass by humans is compared to that of the 
same 55 species of marine mammals in the bottom panel.
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management questions that heretofore 
were impossible to tackle, including 
applications at all of the various levels 
of biological organization. Now we can 
address management that also includes 
the biosphere and the marine environ-
ment (Fig. 3).
To help understand systemic manage-
ment it is useful to note the differences 
between it and conventional manage-
ment. Instructive comparisons involve 
different treatments of reductionism, 
systems, adaptive management, hierar-
chical learning, restoration, and several 
other matters.
Reductionism
To treat the matter of focus, another 
example of ﬁsheries management helps 
make the comparison. Francis et al. 
(1999) point out that, to account for 
complexity, we would want to set allow-
able catches to include consideration of 
the interactions between a target species 
and their competitors, predators, and 
prey. The reductionism of conven-
tional approaches would prevent the 
consideration of predation other than 
that between a resource species and its 
prey and predators and maybe a few of 
the predator/prey interactions of these 
species and their respective prey and 
predators. However, the tenets of man-
agement require that we also account 
for predation in general — not just one, 
two, or several predator/prey pairs, or 
those directly affecting the resource 
species, but, instead, all of the predators 
in the ecosystem and biosphere with all 
processes involved.
Predation is not the only kind of 
interactive relationship to consider. We 
are required to consider not only the 
competitors that consume the same re-
sources consumed by the target species, 
but competition in general, including 
all of the species involved in competi-
tion — competition as a process counting 
among all of the processes involved in 
ecosystems and the biosphere.
Competition and predation are not 
alone among the interactive relation-
ships in ecosystems. It is important to 
account not only for the genetic effects 
that we have on resource species, but 
also evolution in general. We need to 
consider all species and all interac-
tions to account for complexity. Direct 
accounting for predation involves 
the measures of predation rates of all 
predators that feed on a speciﬁc resource 
species such as pollock, herring, or 
anchovy. This makes use of directly 
related information about the predation 
rates needed to guide ﬁshing; we decide 
how large the catch should be and what 
the human predation rate should be to 
fall within the normal range of natural 
variation for direct predation on these 
speciﬁc species.
Through systemic management, 
everything else, including all other 
predator/prey interactions, is taken into 
account automatically, especially when 
human characteristics, such as body size 
(as discussed above) and environmental 
circumstances at the time of application 
(correlative information) are used to 
reﬁne the choice of natural patterns used 
as the source of guiding information. 
This integrative accounting happens by 
virtue of the fact that the patterns seen in 
the probability distributions involved in 
the normal range of natural variation are 
emergent from the complexity of nature 
(Fowler and Crawford, 2004). Thus, in 
our example, all of these predators are 
exposed to the reality, conﬁned by the 
reality, and are products of evolution 
through the effects of the various fac-
tors in this reality (Fowler and Hobbs, 
2002).
The inﬁnite set of factors involved 
exhaust the list of those we wish to ac-
count for in regulating our catch (Fowler 
and Crawford, 2004). This includes the 
prey species on which the target species 
feed, the coevolutionary interactions of 
all species involved in the community, 
physical environmental factors (includ-
Figure 4. — Species frequency distributions showing data of use in guiding ﬁsheries 
management in harvests (consumption) of biomass from individual species. The top 
panel shows 20 species of vertebrate consumers of walleye pollock in the Bering Sea 
in comparison to recent harvests by commercial ﬁsheries (Livingston, 1993; Fowler 
et al., 1999). The middle panel show 12 species of vertebrate consumers of herring 
in the northwest Atlantic (Overholtz et al., 1991; Fowler et al., 1999) and the bottom 
panel shows 12 species of birds as consumers of anchovy in the Benguelan ecosys-
tems off southwest Africa (Crawford et al., 1991), both in comparison to commer-
cial catches of the corresponding resource species.
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ing all historical events) that present 
selective forces involved in evolution, 
and all the rest of complexity for which 
factors listed in Appendix 3 are just a 
beginning. The mistakes of building 
synthetic models to provide advice are 
avoided because nature is used as the 
model and accounts fully for complexity. 
The only models used are the probability 
distribution representing the pattern 
directly relevant to each speciﬁc man-
agement question — more observational 
than synthetic. The proper reductionistic 
information is used realistically. Long-
term risks are considered in proportion 
to their relative importance. If there is 
a risk involving extinction, it is taken 
into account, whether for other species 
or our own.
Systems
Another distinction between systemic 
management and conventional manage-
ment brings us back to a combination of 
Tenets 1 and 2. Systemic management is 
an expansion of systems oriented man-
agement, but it is not “systems manage-
ment.” First, the term “systems manage-
ment” involves the form of words that 
commonly connote control (in violation 
of Tenet 8 — we cannot manage other 
systems without the combination of sys-
temic effects, desired or not). Secondly, 
and not unrelatedly, “systems manage-
ment” never fully succeeds in dealing 
with context or environment. Systems 
always occur within other systems 
(Wilber, 1995; Christensen et al., 1996) 
and interact with other systems.
This leads to the hierarchical nature 
of the resulting levels of organization, 
and the limiting influence they have 
(Fowler and Hobbs, 2002) — limits over 
which our control is limited. Manage-
ment must apply at all levels, and can 
only do so through regulation of our 
inﬂuence on systems at each level. An 
individual engaged in the psychothera-
peutic process will affect changes in his 
or her relationship to family, friends, 
and/or community. We cannot undertake 
psychotherapeutic change without con-
comitant changes in the family or com-
munity. Business must be managed in the 
context of other businesses, questioning 
whether or not any particular business 
should exist at all. Fishing must include 
not only how to ﬁsh, but the extent of the 
area ﬁshed, and whether or not a particu-
lar species or ecosystem should be ﬁshed 
at all. Questions of urban growth must be 
extended to management that addresses 
limits on the number of cities built. Habi-
tat fragmentation brings consideration 
about the portion of the Earth from which 
we need to exclude humans.
Adaptive Management
One of the approaches that has been 
suggested for getting to a workable form 
of management has been what is called 
“adaptive management” (Walters, 1986, 
1992; Mangel et al., 1996; Grumbine, 
1997; Moote et al.2). Part of the objective 
of this process is to gather information 
toward fulﬁlment of the requirements 
of the tenets of management. Beyond 
this, however, it is important to note that 
one of the accomplishments of adaptive 
management is progress in overcoming 
the limits of science in providing guid-
ance. The basis of adaptive management 
is a trial-and-error approach in which we 
learn from experience. 
Species often depend on (and inﬂuence) each other in ways quite distinct 
from the predator/prey interactions that many ecosystem models attempt to 
capture. These types of interactions are exempliﬁed by the burrowing owl, 
Athene cunicularia, which nests in holes dug by small mammals. A similar 
role is played by marine kelp which provides habitat for various life history 
stages of many species. Symbiotic, commensal, socially facilitated, and other 
similar interactions are rarely accounted for objectively in current forms of 
management (Photo courtesy of, and copyright by: Bruce Fowler).
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What we have learned in the last 
century is that while science on its own 
cannot provide all the guidance that 
we need, it can help us see reality so 
that we can understand what to do. The 
strategy involved in adaptive manage-
ment is to try various approaches to see 
if they will work and to learn from the 
experience. This is the way that systemic 
management looks at empirical informa-
tion. Our data on the normal ranges of 
natural variation are observations of the 
products of nature’s processes, includ-
ing the trial-and-error process of natural 
selection. Such data serve as the source 
of guiding information that represents a 
tapping of the information content (a cy-
bernetic interpretation, Bateson, 1972) 
of natural systems through scientiﬁc 
investigation. In other words, distribu-
tions such as those shown in Figures 1–4 
are integrations of the information pre-
sented as the results of nature’s Monte 
Carlo experiments in sustainability that 
have accumulated over eons of adaptive 
management experiments conducted in 
nature, by nature.
Systemic management is action that 
achieves change to fall within the normal 
range of natural variation to take account 
of risks. The accumulation of data on the 
limits to variation is a learning process 
that involves both errors (e.g. failures 
such as extinction) and successes. It is 
a matter of extending the learning exer-
cise based on experiments conducted by 
humans (Lee, 1993b) to see the results 
already accomplished for us by experi-
ments conducted in nature. In this way, 
we attain a deeper and more profound 
source of information (Ehrenfeld, 1993; 
Norton, 1994) that can be used to guide 
us in meeting the requirements of the 
nine tenets.
Hierarchical Learning
Individuals learn from personal expe-
rience and from each other, regardless of 
species. Groups learn from group-level 
experience as well as from other groups. 
Extending this fractal-like pattern, it 
may be true that only the human species 
can consciously learn not only from our 
own experience as a species but from 
that of other species. Systemic manage-
ment is the application of the combina-
tion of information from the learning 
process at each level. This includes the 
processes of learning to learn and learn-
ing to correctly deﬁne the link between 
information and management question 
to establish objectives.
Individual-level learning through 
individual-level experience is well rec-
ognized (both from personal experience 
and scientiﬁc studies). Beyond personal 
experience, is the fact that individuals 
learn from each other, a fact at the heart 
of our educational system, apprentice-
ship, and the recognition of role models. 
Group-level learning through group-
level experience is exempliﬁed by “after 
action review” used in military circles, or 
the “autopsies/analyses” of past actions 
conducted by various organizations. 
Adaptive management (Walters, 1986, 
1992; Mangel et al., 1996; Grumbine, 
1997; Moote et al.2) is the process of 
group-level learning through designed 
experiments. Learning by groups from 
the experience of other groups is exem-
pliﬁed by the benchmarking process in 
business (Spendolini, 1992; Bogan and 
English, 1994; Boxwell, 1994; Camp, 
1995). The historical study of societies 
and cultures by archaeologists includes 
the objective of learning from their 
successes and failures as groups (e.g. 
Redman, 1999). Using other species as a 
source of guidance for human endeavor 
at the species-level makes use of their 
lessons as preserved in their genomes.
However, systemic management is 
not conﬁned to the species level. Such 
a focus would be a form of reduction-
ism in which we would fail to account 
for complexity in violation of several of 
the tenets of management giving rise to 
systemic management, now to include 
the matter of learning at, and managing 
based on the lessons learned at, all levels 
of hierarchical organization. Lessons 
learned at one level (e.g. the individual 
level) are insufﬁcient, and can often be 
misleading, for guidance at other levels 
(e.g. the species and the ecosystem).
Ecosystem restoration
The things that humans can do may 
include ecosystem restoration (Jordan 
et al., 1987), but, in systemic manage-
ment, the important aspect of such 
restoration is that of ﬁnding our place in 
ecosystems. Removing dams and drain-
age canals is part of restoring the state 
of ecosystems by reducing the effects 
of human structures, with the hope of 
reducing human abnormality. However, 
restoration must include more such steps 
to deal with complexity. For ecosystems 
to be restored, we, the human compo-
nents, have to ﬁt within the normal range 
of natural variation for all the other 
ways all species fit into ecosystems 
(e.g. population density, consumption 
rates, occupation of space — the list is 
virtually endless). We are part of eco-
systems (a principle behind Tenet 9), 
and part of what needs to be restored in 
ecosystems is their diversity — reduced 
by any human excesses in which we are 
abnormal. We must carry out restoration 
so that it includes groups of ecosystems, 
landscapes, and the biosphere. Bio-
sphere restoration includes ﬁnding our 
way back to positions within the normal 
ranges of natural variation in a wide va-
riety of ways (Fig. 1–4) — management 
is complicated by involving complexity 
(Tenets 1 and 2). Restoration through 
systemic management is the intransitive 
emphasized over the transitive (Tenet 
8) — doing and being what humans 
can do and be (ﬁtting in) to result in a 
full suite of effects that allow systems 
around us to do and be what is necessary 
for both the human and the nonhuman to 
be both sustaining and sustainable.
Other comparisons
The process of using nature as a 
guide to integrate complexity has been 
compared to that of Bayesian statisti-
cal integration (Fowler, 1999; Fowler 
and Perez, 1999; Fowler et al., 1999; 
Fowler and Hobbs, 2002) wherein 
complexity is accounted for without 
theoretical models. Thus, we avoid the 
limits of science (e.g. limits experienced 
in the partial models that Bayesian ap-
proaches require) because observed 
probability distributions are the results 
of an integration of all of the subsumed 
probability distributions that occur in 
reality (reality is the model; Fowler and 
Crawford, 2004). As such, the results are 
nature’s Nash equilibria (Nash, 1950) 
to account for the hierarchical because 
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they are embedded not only in the vari-
ous levels of biological organization but 
in general (Fowler and Hobbs, 2002). 
Each hierarchical level of organization, 
along with all of its components, con-
tribute to what we see in a way that is 
proportional to the relative importance 
of each element based on an objective 
and exhaustive accounting for what is 
involved. As recognized in complex 
systems science, empirically observed 
patterns are emergent from complexity 
to reﬂect reality, and thus, account for 
it automatically.
Systemic management, then, is 
similar to the process of benchmarking 
in business management (Spendolini, 
1992; Bogan and English, 1994; Box-
well, 1994; Camp, 1995), but with 
a very important difference. It goes 
beyond the consideration of systems 
in benchmarking to include contextual 
scale — questions that would address 
issues such as whether or not any par-
ticular business should be allowed to 
exist at all (regardless of how well it 
is run as a system). Benchmarking in 
business allows for emulation of suc-
cessful businesses (even if they are com-
petitors), yet is based on considerations 
restricted to short time scales, measures 
of economic success, and with minimal, 
human deﬁned, importance attached to 
environmental considerations. Effects 
on other businesses, the environment, 
risks of human extinction, and human 
health are some of the other issues that 
are not given objective and complete 
consideration. Systemic management, 
on the other hand, requires that such 
things be considered and is based on 
information that automatically takes 
them into account. It is an emulation 
of the successes of nature found in the 
central tendencies of species frequency 
distributions such as those presented 
in Figures 1– 4. Emulation of nature 
has been repeatedly suggested for 
management (Ehrenfeld, 1993; Noss, 
1993; Apollonio, 1994; Norton, 1994; 
Salzman, 1994; Christensen et al., 1996; 
Benyus, 1997; Fowler and Hobbs, 2002) 
and is behind the principle involved in 
Tenet 3. Systemic management is bio-
mimicry (Benyus, 1997) expanded to 
include all the various levels of biologi-
cal organization, and speciﬁcally species 
as exempliﬁed in Figures 1–4.
Discussion
The tenets of management specify 
the qualities of an acceptable form of 
management and allows for rejecting 
alternatives. Much management today 
is based on computer models, theories, 
concepts, scale models, arguments based 
on special interests, partial world views, 
or speciﬁc scientiﬁc disciplines that pro-
duce information often only indirectly 
related to speciﬁc management questions. 
Guidance, in such approaches, is based 
on anthropogenic processes that intro-
duce error caused by human limitations. 
The information used is subject to more 
human ﬁlters than is information directly 
observed and collected from nature. 
Scientiﬁc observations are descriptive 
and rarely inform management in the 
ways they are currently produced and 
used (Santos, 1990; Salwasser, 1993). 
To the extent that current approaches 
do not account for reality, especially the 
parts of reality that are unknown, they can 
be discarded as inadequate. Approaches 
that do not apply at, and account for, all 
levels of organization (e.g. biological 
organization from cells to the biosphere) 
are misleading and probably cause more 
problems than they solve. Management 
practices that focus on manipulating 
pests, species, ecosystems, diseases, and 
resources ignore the bulk of the ramiﬁ-
cations of such actions, especially their 
impact from our being outside the normal 
range of natural variation as a species in 
regard to both the actions taken and the 
consequences. Such management may 
meet our short-term needs but does not 
deal with our long-term needs (genera-
tions hundreds or thousands of years from 
now), and does not adequately consider 
risks or complexity.
However, having the grounds for 
rejection does not provide the basis 
for specifying an acceptable alterna-
tive (Haeuber and Franklin, 1996). We 
cannot afford to discard current manage-
ment practices until we have an alterna-
tive that is a genuine improvement. As 
described above, systemic management 
meets the established criteria (unless, of 
course, one of the requirements had been 
that it be simple, easy to do, and without 
signiﬁcant short-term costs in compen-
sating for errors of the past). Guidance 
involves the observation of empirical 
examples of sustainability rather than 
anthropogenic synthesis of selected in-
directly related information. The tenets 
listed in Table 1 and Appendix 2 deﬁne 
systemic management, but only when all 
are implemented collectively. Because 
they deﬁne systemic management, it is 
only natural that it adheres to all of the 
tenets in their amalgamation. Systemic 
management is what we have left when 
other alternatives are rejected. This is 
parallel to the processes of natural selec-
tion resulting in the empirical examples 
of sustainability as evidence of how to 
manage. This brings us full circle to 
seeing management as a matter of ways 
to “be” (behave, ﬁt in, interact) — the 
form of management embodied in sys-
temic management.
The importance of institutional and 
stakeholder involvement in manage-
ment has been identiﬁed and now can 
be seen to be particularly critical to 
enabling management carried out as 
change. Education too, has always been 
an important element of such processes 
(Jarvis, 1978; Agee and Johnson, 1988; 
Aplet et al., 1993; Goudie, 1993; Mazur, 
1994; Meffe, 1994; Sieving and Bio Sci 
296A, 1994; Swimme and Berry, 1994; 
Knight and Bates, 1995; Naiman et al., 
1995; Christensen et al., 1996). Now the 
information from species frequency dis-
tributions such as those shown in Figures 
1–4 represent information that embodies 
the “inter-species education” suggested 
by Swimme and Berry (1994). However, 
education needs to be consistent with re-
ality and is itself complex. To deal with 
reality our education must include the 
deﬁnition of management that involves 
being and doing; management is the 
being and doing behind sustainability 
and the complicated nature of being 
and doing what we can. The manage-
ment — systemic management — is the 
change necessary to be sustainable and 
then the maintenance of sustainability 
achieved. The contribution of education 
to bringing it about is crucial.
Baseline or normative information 
from existing systems is a concern that 
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must be treated carefully. It is clear 
that humans have impacted existing 
systems by being so far outside the 
normal range of natural variation as 
to render such systems subject to their 
own abnormalities (Silver and DeFries, 
1990; Turner et al., 1990; Woodwell, 
1990; World Conservation Monitoring 
Centre, 1992; Meyer and Turner, 1994; 
Christensen et al., 1996; Vitousek et 
al., 1997; Dayton, 1998). The impact 
of our population, consumption, CO2 
production, clear cutting, species ex-
tinction, use of chemicals, and other 
factors means that most systems are in 
a stressed, altered, or abnormal state. 
As such, these systems are not ideal 
sources of standards in their current 
condition. They are not the sources of 
the relatively unbiased information we 
would have in the absence of current 
abnormal human inﬂuence (Christensen 
et al., 1996; Dayton, 1998). Ultimately, 
what is desired is information from 
systems that have naturally evolved 
characteristics (Angermeier and Karr, 
1994) wherein we humans are within 
the normal range of natural variation so 
that reliable normative information will 
be available through the data that sci-
entists can collect. As systems change, 
continued monitoring will identify 
the changes and the data necessary to 
guide humans in making responsive 
change — management to account for 
current circumstances.
It bears reemphasizing that being 
within the normal range of natural 
variation of any particular measure for 
all species is not enough. It is important 
to be within the normal range of natural 
variation as based on measurements 
from other species similar to humans 
so that we have accounted for human 
characteristics such as body size, meta-
bolic category, and trophic level. Of 
this list, the ﬁrst two are things that we 
can change only over evolutionary time 
scales (possibly impossible to change), 
while the latter is something that we 
might choose to change but would prob-
ably ﬁnd unnecessary (Fig. 1) other than 
during the transition involved in solving 
other problems. This being the case, 
if there are management questions for 
which empirical information is related 
to any one, all, or any combination of a 
subset of these three characteristics, the 
correlative interrelationship would be 
important in the process of choosing the 
relevant data for making decisions about 
objectives based on falling within the 
normal range of natural variation (Fowler 
and Perez, 1999; Fowler et al., 1999).
Similarly, correlative information is 
necessary to take into account extenuat-
The thirteen lined ground squirrel, Spermophilus tridecemlineatus, is not ordinarily taken into account in ﬁsheries 
management yet is one species among the many in the biosphere with interactions, however indirectly related, with 
other species. These would be taken into account in management that is fully systemic, to include regulation of human 
inﬂuences on the biosphere (Photo courtesy of, and copyright by: Bruce Fowler).
44 Marine Fisheries Review
ing environmental circumstances. Thus, 
frequency distributions such as shown 
in Figure 3 would apply only to the cli-
matic conditions under which the data 
were collected. Adequate data would 
thus require 1) human inﬂuence within 
normal levels, 2) measurements for spe-
cies otherwise similar to humans, and 
3) circumstances similar to those under 
which management action is being 
taken (Fowler et al., 1999; Fowler and 
Hobbs, 2002).
Terminology can be confusing and 
the term “systemic management,” used 
for the form of management described 
above, is one that might lend to confu-
sion involving the “systemic approach” 
of de Rosnay (1979) and many other 
presentations of “systemic manage-
ment” now seen on the World Wide Web. 
Systemic management, as deﬁned here 
(and in Fowler and Hobbs, 2002), in-
corporates the principles of de Rosnay’s 
systemic approach, but expands upon 
it. Particularly, systemic management 
includes incorporation of the limits 
of science, human perception(s), and 
control as a matter of principle. The 
systemic management described here 
removes the prerogative of engineering 
or designing ecosystems to be the way 
that we want them (Tenet 8); political, 
social, religious, economic, or legal 
special interests are eclipsed by the laws 
of nature.
There are other differences between 
systemic management and the systemic 
approach de Rosnay describes. In at 
least some ways, de Rosnay’s systemic 
approach is a “systems” approach that 
acknowledges context and environment 
(e.g. ecosystems interact with each 
other and occur within the biosphere). 
However, this is accomplished in the 
“systemic approach” at the expense 
of balanced consideration of intrinsic 
factors, or constituent elements, inter-
actions, and dynamics of subsystems. 
The main difference here is that their 
actual relative importance is taken into 
account in systemic management rather 
than being given importance based 
on human appraisal and choices — a 
common problem with much of what 
is described elsewhere as systemic 
management.
One of the things that has confronted 
most of the panels and authors over 
the history of developing “ecosystem 
management” is the misleading nature 
of this form of words. Aside from in-
volving a noun modiﬁer to shorten the 
term (presumably from something like 
“management at the ecosystem level”), 
the term “ecosystem management” 
connotes control over ecosystems. The 
National Research Council (NRC, 1999) 
chose to address this matter by using the 
term “ecosystem-based management.” 
The confusion is that of the distinction 
between the transitive and the intransi-
tive form of the verb “to manage.”
Much of the history of management 
involves use of the transitive form, 
implying that we are making the object 
of our management the wildlife (as in 
wildlife management, e.g. “Journal of 
Wildlife Management”), predator-prey 
interactions (Orians, 1990), the environ-
ment (Costanza et al., 1992; Interagency 
Ecosystem Management Task Force, 
1995; Malone, 1995; and the journal En-
vironmental Management), planet Earth 
(Santos, 1990), and pests (as in pest 
management). Now we have a literature 
replete with the term “ecosystem man-
agement” (e.g. Ovington, 1975; Johnson 
and Agee, 1988; Interagency Ecosystem 
Management Task Force, 1995; Malone, 
1995; Naiman et al., 1995; Christensen 
et al., 1996; Sampson and Knopf, 1996, 
and many other references used in this 
paper); the term often appears in the 
titles of papers dealing with manage-
ment at the ecosystem level.
Words, meanings, and communica-
tion are important in understanding 
systemic management. Tenet 8 requires 
that we be very careful in what we mean 
with the words that we use. As stated 
by Norton (1991), “Adopting a new 
paradigm represents a more radical 
departure; it is to interpret the world 
in a new format, a format that is given 
shape and structure by the development 
of new concepts and a vocabulary to 
express them.” The shift involved in 
getting to systemic management is one 
toward direct management of ourselves, 
thus emphasizing the intransitive form 
of the verb “to manage.” To accomplish 
progress in this shift, other terms have 
been used. Salwasser et al. (1993) use 
the term “ecosystem perspective,” and 
Vallentyne and Hamilton (1988) refer to 
the management of human interaction, 
uses and abuses of resources. In the end, 
it is the ﬁsheries that we manage — not 
the ﬁsh, not the ecosystem from which 
the ﬁsh are extracted, nor the biosphere. 
In systemic management, management 
at the ecosystem level is regulation of 
our interactions, relationships, and inﬂu-
ences on such systems.
It is important to distinguish reduc-
tionism in science and management. 
Every question has a speciﬁc reduction-
istic focus. We have to be able to reduce 
management questions to speciﬁcs in 
order to make decisions and carry out 
management. Each management ques-
tion must be framed in very speciﬁc 
units and dimensions. If it were not 
for the capacity of science to focus on 
speciﬁc measures of variation (Tenet 3), 
we would be left without the information 
that science can produce. Management 
would be without the information it 
needs to meet the nine tenets substanti-
ated above. The limits of science in its 
reductionism are reﬂected more in the 
inability to recombine information than 
in the capacity to observe objectively. 
The door is open for taking advantage 
of the fact that science provides the most 
objective means that we have for tapping 
the information regarding the parts of 
complexity so that patterns can represent 
complexity (thus, fully accounting for 
complexity–reality) — each part being a 
product of complexity (emergent).
We have not completed the task 
of dealing with the matter of rela-
tive importance. Exercising systemic 
management is something that clearly 
cannot accomplish desired objectives 
overnight. Where do we start? How long 
do we have? What objectives are most 
important to achieve ﬁrst? What are our 
priorities (Schramm and Hubert, 1996)? 
If we were to ﬁnd ourselves within the 
normal range of natural variation for ev-
erything that we can think of to measure, 
maybe there would be no problem. How-
ever, we do not ﬁnd ourselves in this 
situation (Fig. 1–4; Fowler and Hobbs 
2002, 2003). If we were abnormal for 
only two measures, which would be the 
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most important to tackle ﬁrst? There 
are helpful guidelines that emerge from 
consideration of complexity, especially 
the scale of complexity involved in the 
breadth of biological organization, and 
it is important to understand them, and 
that we must gamble, to a certain extent, 
in making our choices.
One guideline stems from the degree 
of human departure from the central 
tendencies of measures of normal 
ranges of natural variation — the mag-
nitude of abnormality or the extent 
of problems. If we are at the center 
of such a distribution (e.g. as we are 
with regard to trophic level, panel A of 
Fig. 1), there is not the urgency for 
change that there is regarding the rates 
at which we consume biomass (Fig. 
1–4). This guideline places more im-
portance on cases where humans are 
most removed from central locations by 
treating them as more extreme problems. 
However, things are never as simple as 
we would like and this is only a start.
If we restricted our management of 
human qualities at the individual level 
in such an approach, we might succeed 
in achieving a constrained diversity of 
hair length and not notice that it was 
more important to pay attention to 
body temperature and fevers of only 
a degree or two. We recognize body 
temperature, body weight, and blood 
pressure as more important than length 
of hair or body odor. We recognize this 
importance, in part, based on the risk of 
death. However, even at the individual 
level, we do not always know if we are 
dealing with things that are sources of 
short-term or long-term risk, nor what 
the risks are. One role for paleontolo-
gists, epidemiologists, sociologists, and 
other scientists is to relate the risk of 
extinction that we may face to the vari-
ous things that we are doing. However, 
as seen with all of science, this could 
result in placing too much importance 
on extinction. Nevertheless, it would 
be helpful to know what we are doing 
to court such risks. It may be helpful to 
have some sense of things that we are 
doing as a species that are more like a 
41°C fever than are styles of dress and 
food preferences for individuals.
In this regard the matter of hierarchi-
cal complexity becomes useful. Con-
sider another example of the regulation 
of ﬁsheries. Imagine the hypothetical 
situation of ﬁnding ourselves outside 
the normal range of natural variation 
for the age distribution, location, size, 
and genetic effects of our catches from 
The common dolphin, Delphinus delphis, is a species with body size approximating that of humans. It, along with other species 
of similar size, can serve as examples of sustainability for our species so as to take body size into account (Photo courtesy of, and 
copyright by: Larry Hobbs, Inland Whale).
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a particular species. Our understanding 
of the system (still hypothetical, but now 
much like what we experience) leads 
to realizing that solving the problem of 
age distribution, location, and genetic 
effects requires reducing the size of the 
catch (everything is interconnected). 
This helps focus on the importance of 
dealing with the size of the catch ﬁrst, 
mostly because solving that problem 
will also contribute a great deal to solv-
ing the problem of being outside the 
normal range of natural variation for 
other issues as well (e.g. intensity of 
genetic impact of harvests; systemic 
management will always involve this 
kind of consistency, Tenet 1).
The impossibility of short-term solu-
tions to problems before us is nowhere 
more clear than in the suggestion that 
people (as individuals) consume less to 
ﬁt humans within the normal range of 
natural variation for biomass consump-
tion (Fig. 3). Solving the species-level 
problem only through changes in indi-
vidual-level behavior today would put 
the consumption by individuals outside 
(far below) the normal range of natural 
variation for meeting one’s minimum 
daily requirements (it would result in 
starvation). Other factors and long time 
frames will have to be dealt with (assum-
ing that nature does not take the upper 
hand before we have time to ﬁnd a place 
within natural limits; Darwin 1953). As 
is maintained very clearly in much of the 
scholarly deliberations about such issues, 
we have to deal with the very sensitive 
problem of human overpopulation (Fig. 
2; American Society of Mammalogists, 
1970; Rosenzweig, 1974; Catton, 1980; 
Ehrlich, 1985; Meffe, 1994; Chris-
tensen et al., 1996; Fowler and Hobbs, 
2003) — a problem that can be solved 
only very slowly if we conﬁne ourselves 
within the normal range of natural varia-
tion for mortality and reproductive rates. 
However, solutions to such problems re-
quire that we restrict such rates to levels 
that are below the mean to make up for 
ground lost in the centuries during which 
they have been above the mean.
Summary
Nine core tenets have emerged from 
reviews of the history and evolution of 
thought about the management of our 
use of resources. This consideration was 
spurred, in part, by recognition of the 
need to expand the realms of manage-
ment to include ecosystems as a step 
toward accounting for complexity. These 
tenets, and the principles behind them, 
serve as a basis for rejecting most forms 
of conventional management while, at 
the same time, deﬁning the characteris-
tics of an acceptable form of manage-
ment. Systemic management is one 
option that meets these criteria by being 
deﬁned by them; the basic principles are 
taken into account. Systemic manage-
ment is management that fully embraces 
Tenet 3 (Fowler and Hobbs, 2002) and, 
in so doing, simultaneously succeeds in 
adhering to all eight of the remaining 
principles as well as others suggested 
in the literature. Humans and human 
institutions are responsible for carrying 
out management to become sustainable 
within systems that can, in their own 
reactions, sustain humans. Until such 
time that a better form of management 
materializes, it is imperative that action 
be taken to solve the problems identiﬁed 
(unless, of course, we choose to ignore 
the principles and tenets outlined above 
and let nature take its course and endure 
the consequences — always an option).
Systemic management avoids using 
science to construct theories, concepts, 
or synthetic models to give management 
advice based on such approaches; it 
avoids advice of strictly anthropogenic 
origin. In so doing it circumvents many 
human limitations, especially those of 
science. Instead, it is based on empirical 
measures of what can be observed by sci-
ence so that nature serves as the model. 
The things chosen for research, investi-
gation, and measurement are as directly 
related to the management question as 
possible. This is a process that does 
involve theories, concepts, and models, 
but only in ways to facilitate making 
observations (e.g. deriving estimates) di-
rectly related to management questions. 
This makes the process of management 
based on such information as realistic 
as possible. Nature is the model, and 
we need to use our best tools to see the 
inherent guiding information, regardless 
of the management question.
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Appendix 1
Management Tenets and  
Principles Since the 1970’s
Czech and Krausman’s (1997) litera-
ture review on “ecosystem management” 
elaborates on important principles and 
guidelines for management at the eco-
system level, especially as produced by 
individuals or small groups of coauthors. 
This is in contrast to the products of 
panels and committees exempliﬁed by 
Christensen et al., 1996. Later publica-
tions by individuals or informal groups 
also contain lists of various tenets (e.g. 
Fowler et al., 1999; Francis et al., 1999; 
and Uhl et al., 2000). This appendix 
presents a summary of principles and 
tenets of management as represented 
in the literature since 1970, largely 
supplementing the review by McCor-
mick (1999).
First Airlie House: 
Principles that were developed in the 
ﬁrst Airlie House meeting were reported 
in Holt and Talbot (1978) as:
1) The ecosystem should be maintained 
in a desirable state such that:
a) consumptive and nonconsumptive 
values could be maximized on a 
continuing basis,
b) present and future options are 
ensured, and
c) risk of irreversible changes or 
long-term adverse effects as a 
result of use is minimized.
2) Management decisions should in-
clude a safety factor to allow for the 
fact that knowledge is limited and 
institutions are imperfect.
3) Measures to conserve a wild living 
resource should be formulated and 
applied so as to avoid wasteful use 
of other resources.
4) Survey or monitoring, analysis, and 
assessment should precede planned 
use and accompany actual use of 
wild living resources. The results 
should be made available promptly 
for critical public review.
Ecosystem Management Workshop: 
A workshop was held at the Uni-
versity of Washington’s Pack Forest in 
1987 to address the concept of ecosys-
tem management (Agee and Johnson, 
1988). The principles put forward by 
the workshop were:
1)  Cooperation and open negotiation 
are important to success. Given that 
park and wilderness ecosystems are 
bounded politically, and that things 
important to people move across 
those boundaries, cooperation, hon-
esty, and openness are essential.
2)  Different agencies and neighbors 
have different mandates, objectives, 
and constituencies to which the in-
terested parties must be sensitive.
3)  Success should be measured by 
results — progress toward goals of 
component condition and ecosystem 
maintenance — not by amount or 
quality of coordination.
4) Threshold management goals are es-
tablished by the park and wilderness 
legislation. Setting further goals 
will be site-speciﬁc process taking 
account of the context of the park or 
wilderness within its regional and 
national social matrix.
5) Clearly defined problems have 
greater chance of being resolved.
6)  Over the long term, ecosystem 
management must accommodate 
multiple uses at a regional scale and 
dominant or restricted use at the unit 
or site scale.
7) High quality information is neces-
sary to identify trends and respond to 
them intelligently and deliberately.
8) Social, political, and environmental 
issues must be viewed in a system 
context, not as individual issues. 
Individual components may be the 
focus within that context.
9) All management is a long-term 
experiment, and decisions are 
always made with less than com-
plete information.
Costanza et al. (1992):
In 1992, Costanza et al. (1992) refer 
to Norton (1991) in listing ﬁve axioms 
suggested for management:
1) The axiom of dynamism: nature is 
more profoundly a set of processes than 
a collection of objects; all is in ﬂux.
2) The axiom of relatedness: all 
processes are related to all other 
processes.
3) The axiom of hierarchy: processes 
are not related equally but unfold 
in systems within systems, which 
differ mainly regarding the temporal 
and spatial scale on which they are 
organized.
4) The axiom of creativity: the autono-
mous processes of nature are cre-
ative and represent the basis for all 
biologically based productivity. The 
vehicle of that creativity is energy 
ﬂowing through systems which in 
turn ﬁnd stable contexts in larger 
systems, which provide sufﬁcient 
stability to allow self-organization 
within them through repetition and 
duplication.
5) The axiom of differential fragility: 
the ecological systems, which form 
the context of all human activities, 
vary on the extent to which they 
can absorb and equilibrate human-
caused disruptions in their autono-
mous processes.
Second Airlie House:
In 1994, the principles and tenets of 
management listed at the ﬁrst Airlie 
House meeting were reconsidered 
and one principle (the ﬁrst point listed 
below) and six tenets (points 2–7) were 
developed at the second Airlie House 
meeting (paraphrased from Mangel et 
al., 1996):
1) Sustainability is inconsistent with 
unlimited growth of human con-
sumption of, and demand for, re-
sources. 
2) Present and future options are to be 
achieved by maintaining biological 
diversity at genetic, species, popula-
tion, and ecosystem levels. Neither 
the resource nor other components 
of the ecosystem should be per-
turbed beyond natural boundaries 
of variation. 
3) Assessment (including ecological 
and sociological effects) of re-
source use should precede both pro-
posed use and proposed restriction 
or expansion of ongoing use of a 
resource.
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4) Management must be based on 
understanding of the structure and 
dynamics of ecosystems while ac-
counting for both ecological and 
sociological factors.
5) The full range of knowledge and 
skills from the natural and social 
sciences must be brought to bear in 
dealing with conservation problems.
6) Effective conservation requires un-
derstanding and taking account of 
the motives, interests, and values of 
all users and stakeholders, but not by 
simply averaging their positions.
7) Effective conservation requires 
communication that is interactive, 
reciprocal, and continuous.
Moote et al.: 
At about the same time Moote et al. 
(text footnote 2) compiled a list of points 
that are a mixture of deﬁnitions, tenets, 
and principles that they found important 
as based on a review of literature deal-
ing with management, again primarily 
“ecosystem management”:
Ecosystem management is a manage-
ment philosophy which focuses on de-
sired states, rather than system outputs, 
and which recognizes the need to protect 
or restore critical ecological compo-
nents, functions, and structures in order 
to sustain resources in perpetuity.
1)  Socially Deﬁned Goals and Manage-
ment Objectives
 Desired future conditions and the 
means by which we choose to 
achieve these conditions are social 
values. Therefore ecosystem man-
agement, like all forms of manage-
ment, is a socially deﬁned process. 
There is nevertheless a recognized 
need for human society to adapt its 
activities to protect crucial ecologi-
cal processes.
2)  Integrated, Holistic Science
 Ecosystem management uses a ho-
listic approach, rather than focusing 
on speciﬁc system outputs. It at-
tempts to conserve biodiversity from 
the genetic to the community level. 
Ecosystems are recognized as open, 
changing, complex systems. Eco-
system management focuses on the 
dynamic interrelations of systems 
components — including social, 
political, economic, biological, and 
physical features — and requires 
better understanding of each of these 
components and their interrelations. 
Humans are recognized as a part of 
ecosystems.
3)  Broad Spatial and Temporal Scales
 Speciﬁc scales of management will 
be determined individually for each 
system, based on societal values and 
goals. In general, however, ecosys-
tem management requires manage-
ment on larger spatial and longer 
temporal time scales than has been 
the norm in resource management. 
Ecosystem management means 
management across ecological, po-
litical, generational, and ownership 
boundaries.
4)  Collaborative Decision Building
 Successful planning for ecosystem 
management must be sensitive to 
the different mandates, objectives, 
and constituencies of agencies and 
landowners. Therefore, there is a 
need for cooperative, integrated data 
collection and planning character-
ized by open communication among 
scientists, resource management 
agencies, and private interests. Par-
ticipants should strive for joint orga-
nizational and community learning 
that acknowledges the values and 
expertise each participant brings to 
the planning process.
5)  Adaptable Institutions
 Institutions for ecosystem manage-
ment must reﬂect its experimental 
nature. Organizations, laws, policies, 
and management practices need to 
be ﬂexible in order that they may 
adapt to changes in social values, 
environmental conditions, political 
pressures, available data, and knowl-
edge. Adaptable institutions treat 
management as a learning process 
in which decisions are continuously 
revisited and revised, and therefore 
allow planning and decision-making 
to go forward in the face of uncertain-
ty. At the same time, it is recognized 
that institutional decision-making 
is bounded by the currently deﬁned 
legal limits of planning and manage-
ment and by socio-political factors.
Ecological Society of America: 
Similar elements of management 
are found in the Ecological Society of 
America’s report (Christensen et al., 
1996):
1) Sustainability. Ecosystem manage-
ment does not focus primarily on 
“deliverables” but rather regards 
intergenerational sustainability as a 
precondition.
2) Goals. Ecosystem management 
establishes measurable goals that 
specify future processes and out-
comes necessary for sustainability.
3) Sound ecological models and under-
standing. Ecosystem management 
relies on research performed at all 
levels of ecological organization.
4) Complexity and connectedness. 
Ecosystem management recog-
nizes that biological diversity and 
structural complexity strengthen 
ecosystems against disturbance 
and supply the genetic resources 
necessary to adapt to long-term 
change.
5) The dynamic character of ecosys-
tems. Recognizing that change and 
evolution are inherent in ecosystem 
sustainability, Ecosystem manage-
ment avoids attempts to “freeze” 
ecosystems in a particular state or 
conﬁguration.
6) Context and scale. Ecosystem pro-
cesses operate over a wide range 
of spatial and temporal scales, and 
their behavior at any given location 
is greatly affected by surrounding 
systems. Thus, there is no single 
appropriate scale or time frame for 
management.
7) Humans as ecosystem components. 
Ecosystem management values the 
active role of humans in achieving 
sustainable management goals.
8) Adaptability and accountability. 
Ecosystem management acknowl-
edges that current knowledge and 
paradigms of ecosystem function are 
provisional, incomplete, and subject 
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to change. Management approaches 
must be viewed as hypotheses to be 
tested by research and monitoring 
programs.
NMFS Ecosystem Principles 
Report: 
This report (NMFS, 1999), delivered 
to the U.S. Congress, was entitled: Eco-
system-Based Fishery Management and 
contained eight principles:
1)  The ability to predict ecosystem 
behavior is limited.
2)  Ecosystems have real thresholds and 
limits which, when exceeded, can 
effect major system restructuring.
3)  Once thresholds and limits have 
been exceeded, changes can be ir-
reversible.
4)  Diversity is important to ecosystem 
functioning.
5)  Multiple scales interact within and 
among ecosystems.
6)  Components of ecosystems are 
linked.
7)  Ecosystem boundaries are open.
8)  Ecosystems change with time.
Appendix 2
Nine tenets of management 
from the management literature 
(Appendix 1) and synthesized in this 
paper and summarized in Table 1.
The following is a detailed listing 
of the nine tenets of management from 
Table 1, as substantiated in this paper 
based on the wealth of management lit-
erature (e.g. Appendix 1). This literature 
(as cited in the text of this paper) presents 
a variety of basic principles (accepted 
assertions about reality, axioms, current 
understanding, or beliefs) and their relat-
ed tenets (deﬁnition of, requirements of, 
or criteria for, acceptable management). 
This material is found primarily in the 
wealth of literature treating the concept 
of management focused on applications 
at the ecosystem level. The tenets may 
be treated as a set of criteria to judge or 
evaluate the adequacy of any particular 
management practice. They also deﬁne 
systemic management (e.g. Fowler and 
Perez, 1999; Fowler, 2002; Fowler and 
Hobbs, 2002) as a management scheme 
that meets or adheres to all nine criteria 
or tenets.
Tenet 1: Consistent applicability: 
Management must in every way be 
applicable at all levels of biological 
organization, simultaneously and 
consistently. Any application of 
management must be consistent with 
other applications, and management 
must apply simultaneously at the various 
levels of biological organization. For 
example, the harvest of biomass from 
individual resource species cannot be in 
conﬂict with management of the harvest 
of biomass from the respective ecosys-
tems. Similarly, biomass consumption 
by humans from the biosphere must 
be guided by principles that are not in 
conﬂict with those guiding the harvest 
of biomass from either an individual 
resource species or any particular eco-
system.
Tenet 2: Accountability for complex-
ity: Management must account for 
complexity/reality and each element 
and factor must receive impor-
tance in proportion to its relative 
significance. Management action 
must be based on an approach that ac-
counts for reality (Appendix 3) in its 
complexity over the various scales of 
time, space, and biological organization. 
The context of environmental factors 
(e.g. ecological complexity) must be 
accounted for along with the elements 
of stochasticity and the diversity of 
processes, mechanics, and dynamics. 
The complexes of chemical and physi-
cal substances and processes as well as 
energetic dynamics must be taken into 
account, along with evolutionary pro-
cesses at all levels. These factors must be 
given weight in decision-making that is 
in proportion to their relative importance 
and all must be dealt with simultane-
ously. Furthermore, we must be able to 
account for uncertainty, including what 
we cannot know, or may never know.
Tenet 3: Guidance from normative 
patterns: Systems, components of sys-
tems, processes, and interactions must 
fall within their respective normal 
ranges of natural variation. A core 
principle of management is that of 
undertaking actions that ensure that 
processes, relationships, individuals, 
species, and ecosystems are within (or 
will return to) their respective normal 
ranges of natural variation (based on 
literature as reviewed by Fowler and 
Hobbs, 2002) as components of the 
more aggregated levels of biological 
organization. Included are evolution-
ary processes, and all those involved in 
ecosystem dynamics, as well as physi-
ological and embryological processes. 
Any form of management must apply 
this principle.
Tenet 4: Risk averse: Management 
must be precautionary and avoid risk 
in achieving sustainability. Man-
agement must be risk averse, exercise 
precaution, and achieve sustainabil-
ity. Sustainability is, by deﬁnition, not 
achieved by any form of management 
that generates risk rather than mini-
mizes it.
Tenet 5: Interdisciplinary: Manage-
ment must be based on the realm of 
scientiﬁc studies and thereby include 
all disciplines. Management must be 
information based (Tenet 6). Guidance 
must be available to management in the 
form of useful information that enables 
managers to develop meaningful, mea-
surable, and reasonable goals and objec-
tives (Tenet 7). This information must be 
based on interdisciplinary approaches 
involving science (Tenet 6) to adhere to 
the principles behind Tenet 2.
Tenet 6: Information based: Man-
agement must be based upon infor-
mation, including the products of 
scientiﬁc research, monitoring, and 
assessment. Management must in-
clude science (scientiﬁc methods and 
principles) in research, monitoring, 
and assessment, not only to produce the 
information that is used for guidance 
(Tenet 5), but also for evaluation of 
progress in achieving established goals 
and objectives (Tenet 7).
Tenet 7: Measurability: Manage-
ment must be guided by clearly 
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defined and measurable goals and 
objectives. There must be clearly 
deﬁned goals and objectives that are 
measurable to provide quantitative 
evaluation of problems to be solved 
and gauge progress in solving them. 
There must be guidelines, criteria, and 
standards of reference.
Tenet 8: Limited control: Manage-
ment must be carried out in a way 
that recognizes that control over other 
systems (e.g. species and ecosystems) 
is mostly impossible. It must be rec-
ognized that complete control over other 
species and ecosystems is impossible. 
The best we can do is control human 
action (Christensen et al., 1996; Holling 
and Meffe, 1996; Mangel et al., 1996) 
while realizing that, even here, control 
remains incomplete. For example, we 
can better control ﬁshing effort than 
we can the ﬁsh, and certainly cannot 
control the fact that ﬁshing will have 
its consequences, many of which will 
be both unintended and undesirable. We 
can inﬂuence but not control resource 
populations. We can inﬂuence any eco-
system, but we cannot control them to 
avoid indirect changes, side effects, or 
secondary reactions brought about by 
our inﬂuence. The guidance (Tenet 7) 
that we need for management is guid-
ance regarding the level of inﬂuence 
(e.g. harvest rate) that meets the other 
criteria of this list.
Tenet 9: Human involvement: Man-
agement must involve humans and 
their role as components of at least 
some natural systems. We must 
consider humans to be part of complex 
biological systems. Humans must have 
the option of being components of at 
least some ecosystems to avoid the un-
realistic option of precluding human ex-
istence. Humans are not separate from, 
unaffected by, or free of the limits of the 
systems of which we are a part.
Appendix 3
Complexity
Part of the concept of expanding 
management to include ecosystems 
is the knowledge (axiom or principle) 
that biotic systems are complex and 
interconnected (Costanza et al., 1992; 
Christensen et al., 1996). They all have 
many components and involve many 
processes. In particular, ecosystems 
exist in a context, part of which is made 
up of, or acted upon by, other ecosys-
tems. They involve both intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors (Ingram and Molnar, 
1990). There are scales of time, space, 
and levels of organization involved in 
systems and their processes, dynam-
ics, and attributes. In the end, the 
concept at the core of considerations 
of complexity in management is that 
complexity per se must be considered; 
we must consider everything (Lackey, 
1995–96).
Components
The things that make up systems such 
as ecosystems are important, not only 
as determining factors in what these 
systems are but to the process of decid-
ing what to do in management (O’Neill, 
1989). The components of more inclu-
sive systems involve all the living and 
nonliving elements of such systems 
(Van Dyne, 1969; King, 1993; Schramm 
and Hubert, 1996). Systems include 
the abiotic environment (Allen and 
Hoekstra, 1992). Species (Woodley et 
al., 1993) in categories such as competi-
tors, predators, and prey (Francis et al., 
1999) are part of the general diversity of 
ecosystems. The physical environment 
is part of the habitat that also has its 
biotic elements (Lovejoy et al., 1984; 
Wilcox and Murphy, 1985; Simberloff, 
1988). Mineral elements make up part of 
the physical environment and are parts 
of, and required by, the biotic compo-
nents (Likens, 1992; King, 1993). In 
addition to the material components of 
ecosystems, there is energy in its various 
forms at the core of the function of biotic 
systems (Bakuzis, 1969; Baron and 
Galvin, 1990). Individual species are 
represented in ecosystems by individual 
organisms and populations that make up 
biotic communities (Christensen et al., 
1996). If the ecosystem is large enough, 
many species will be represented by 
several genetically distinct populations 
interacting as metapopulations (Suther-
land, 1990).
Processes
The components of ecosystems 
(Clark and Zaunbrecher, 1987; Costan-
za et al., 1992; Davis and Simon, 1994), 
and entire ecosystems (Francis, 1993; 
Christensen et al., 1996; Mangel et al., 
1996; Moote et al. (text footnote 2)), 
are involved in processes, interactions, 
relationships, and dynamics. Processes 
have been seen as important in the 
complexity of ecosystems and as fac-
tors for consideration in management 
(O’Neill, 1989; Noss, 1990b; Mlad-
enhoff and Pastor, 1993; Maerz, 1994; 
Pickett and Ostfeld, 1995; Christensen 
et al., 1996: Mangel et al., 1996). More 
speciﬁc elements include physiologi-
cal processes (Woodley et al., 1993; 
Christensen et al., 1996), genetic pro-
cesses (Simberloff, 1988; Vrijenhoek, 
1989; Woodruff, 1989; Policansky and 
Magnuson, 1998; NRC, 1996, 1999), 
trophic ﬂow (Ulanowicz, 1992), ex-
tinction (Terborgh, 1974; Wilcox and 
Murphy, 1985; Norton, 1987; Myers, 
1989; Reed, 1989; Westman, 1990; 
Gaston and Blackburn, 2000), popula-
tion variation, predation (Orians, 1990), 
and diseases (Pimm, 1991). The dynam-
ics of populations are involved (Baron 
and Galvin, 1990; Woodley, 1993). In 
the interactions among species there 
is inﬂuence on composition and func-
tion of ecosystems studied as the key-
stone effect (Westman, 1990). Other 
processes (Christensen et al., 1996) 
include photosynthesis (or primary 
production, Woodley, 1993), decompo-
sition (Woodley, 1993), the hydrologic 
cycle, evapotranspiration, geomorphic 
processes and erosion, and other soil 
or below-ground processes (Baron and 
Galvin, 1990). The bio-geochemical/
energetic concepts of the “physiology” 
of ecosystems has been a long-stand-
ing view of the function of ecosystems 
with their ﬂux of nutrients and mineral 
elements (e.g. Bakuzis, 1969; Loucks, 
1985; O’Neill et al., 1986; Ehrlich, 
1987; Baron and Galvin, 1990; Likens, 
1992; Woodley, 1993; Moote et al. 
(text footnote 2)) — all part of internal 
ecosystem function (Christensen et 
al., 1996). All of the components are 
involved in interactions, processes, and 
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evolution (O’Neill, 1989; Mangel et al., 
1996) sometimes seen as components 
of diversity (Noss, 1990b). In regard to 
the genetics of species within ecosys-
tems and evolutionary dynamics there 
are a number of recognized processes 
(Terborgh, 1974; Ehrlich, 1987; Orians, 
1990; Sutherland, 1990; Apollonio, 
1994; Christensen et al., 1996). These 
include extinction (Terborgh, 1974; 
Fowler and MacMahon, 1982; Lovejoy 
et al., 1984; Wilcox and Murphy, 1985; 
Myers 1989; Reed 1989; Orians 1990; 
Westman 1990), biotically controlled 
evolution, dispersibility (dispersal or 
mobility, including invasions and in-
troductions (Terborgh, 1974; Westman, 
1990)), specialization, mutualism, and 
coevolution (Norton, 1987; Westman, 
1990; Thompson, 1994). Individual 
organisms are among the components 
of ecosystems, and their behavior and 
physiology (Christensen et al., 1996) 
count among the processes within 
ecosystems.
At the more general level, ecosys-
tems themselves have behaviors and 
properties that involve dynamics; 
ecosystems themselves change (Pﬁster, 
1993; Christensen et al., 1996). Howev-
er, one of the processes of ecosystems 
is that of their homoeostatic behavior 
(Apollonio, 1994) or their tendency to 
exhibit pattern and attributes. In other 
words, such systems have a tendency 
to exhibit variation, or change, that 
is confined to within certain limits 
to show pattern (Fowler and Hobbs, 
2002). Because of the complexity of 
ecosystems, especially the interrelated 
nature of the components (Costanza 
et al., 1992), there are repercussions 
stemming from the inﬂuence of any 
species. These complex processes 
are often referred to as ripple effects 
(Wilcox and Murphy, 1985). Out of all 
of this emerges the novelty of ecosys-
tems and their components (Costanza 
et al., 1992).
Scale: Temporal, Spatial, 
Hierarchical
That management must consider 
context and scale is given the status of 
a separate tenet by Christensen et al. 
(1996) and is mentioned in many papers 
on management (Moote et al. (text foot-
note 2)). The need to account for spatial 
scales (Steedman and Haider, 1993) and 
temporal scales (Noss, 1993) is extended 
to that of organizational complexity and 
hierarchical context (King, 1993; Apol-
lonio, 1994; Grumbine, 1997). Complex-
ity is involved in the fact that temporal 
scales extend from the immediate to the 
evolutionary and geological. The need 
to account for long-term temporal scales 
is often emphasized (e.g. Lee, 1993a; 
Schramm and Hubert, 1996; Moote et 
al. (text footnote 2)). Large geographic 
scales are also emphasized (Schramm 
and Hubert, 1996). These extensions 
are often mentioned in regard to prob-
lems identified with attempts to take 
small-scale approaches to the exclusion 
of consideration of long-term, global, 
or more inclusive levels of biological 
organization. As with moves to extend 
single-species approaches to include 
ecosystems, these are not meant to move 
from (abandon) one to embrace another 
approach but to expand management in 
such a way that issues of all scales are 
included whether temporal, spatial (Sch-
ramm and Hubert, 1996), or hierarchical 
(Costanza et al., 1992). Extensions to 
higher levels of organization are exempli-
ﬁed by work on metapopulation analysis 
and the need to consider such issues in 
management (e.g. Simberloff, 1988).
The issue of scale brings on the matter 
of control (Tenet 8). An ecosystem rep-
resents the cumulative effects of other 
elements of a species’ environment. As 
such, the higher (more complicated, 
more inclusive) levels of organization 
are seen as controlling of their compo-
nents (Salthe, 1985; O’Neill et al., 1986; 
Koestler, 1987; Costanza et al., 1992; 
Apollonio, 1994; Wilber, 1995; Fowler 
and Hobbs, 2002) in ways that are of 
greater importance than the effects of 
just one element at the same level. Thus 
the population of one species is more 
regulated by an ecosystem than it is by 
any one population of another species 
within the same ecosystem.
Ecosystem attributes
Despite the fact that ecosystems 
change (plus the fact that their compo-
nents exhibit a great deal of dynamic 
properties) structure and pattern are 
inherent properties of ecosystems, some 
of which are emergent from the com-
plexity of nature, and many of which are 
referred to as macroecological patterns 
(Brown, 1995; Gaston and Blackburn, 
2000). Various measures of diversity 
provide a metric of one such attribute 
(e.g. species numbers). Most such attri-
butes are viewed as important character-
istics for consideration in management 
(e.g. Wilcox and Murphy, 1985; Orians 
et al., 1990; Westman, 1990; Noss, 
1993; Woodley et al., 1993; Davis and 
Simon, 1994; Noss and Cooperrider, 
1994; Wood, 1994; Naiman et al., 1995; 
Moote et al. (text footnote 2)). Measures 
of diversity are not restricted to taxo-
nomic units and can include genetic or 
functional considerations — all seen as 
important in management (Orians et al., 
1990; Westman, 1990). Other attributes 
seen as important in both the character-
ization of ecosystems and management 
involve trophic level, food web struc-
ture, distribution of matter and energy, 
and range distribution of populations 
(Terborgh, 1974; Baron and Galvin, 
1990; King, 1993; Christensen et al., 
1996). The composition of ecosystems, 
in this regard, is often recognized as 
important to consider and viewed as part 
of the integrity of ecosystems (Noss, 
1990a; Noss, 1993; Pﬁster, 1993; Davis 
and Simon, 1994).
